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THE ETHICS OF CAUSE LAWYERING:  AN EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AS CAUSE 
LAWYERS
INTRODUCTION
In 1990,  Jose Orlando Lopez retained a prominent criminal defense 
attorney, Barry Tarlow, to represent  him on serious narcotics charges.1  Mr. 
Tarlow’s understanding with his client was that Tarlow would “vigorously 
defend and try” the case but that he would not negotiate on Lopez’s behalf
if Lopez decided to turn in state’s evidence and become an informant in 
exchange for a reduced sentence.  For moral and ethical reasons, it was 
Tarlow’s  general policy “not to represent clients in negotiations with the 
government concerning cooperation.”  (Indeed, later in the case when 
Lopez decided to enter into a cooperator’s agreement with the prosecution, 
Lopez sought to negotiate the deal on his own without the assistance of 
counsel.  These pro se plea negotiations ultimately failed).  According to 
Tarlow, such cooperation negotiations were “personally, morally and 
ethically offensive” and he would no sooner represent a snitch than he 
would represent  “Nazis or an Argentine general said to be responsible for 
10,000 ‘disappearances.’”2
Whatever one thinks of Tarlow’s policy, this case highlights an 
important truth.  For Barry Tarlow, and many other defense attorneys, the 
practice of criminal defense is about much more than helping individual 
clients achieve their individual goals.  Criminal defense attorneys are often 
motivated by an intricate set of moral and ideological principles that belie 
their reputations as amoral (if not immoral) “hired guns” who, for the right 
price, would do anything to get their guilty clients off.3  Some of the 
collateral causes advanced by these attorneys are laudable while others are 
not.  But almost all of them raise ethical concerns that the rules of ethics 
and professionalism are not well-equipped to resolve.  This is a note-worthy 
problem because cause-lawyering has played an important role in socio-
legal movements in this country.
The cause-motivated approach to lawyering contradicts the traditional 
view of those in the legal profession as rights-enforcers or as neutral 
advocates of their client’s interests.4  Weighing the virtue of neutrality in an 
1. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
2. Gail D. Cox, Fighting and Flaunting It, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 19, 1993, at 28.
3. For a more detailed description of the “hired gun” approach to lawyering, see William Simon, 
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.
4. See Austin Sarat, Between (the Presence of) Violence and (the Possibility of ) Justice, in
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 318-19 (Austin 
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (distinguishing between lawyers who are “hired guns” and use 
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advocate versus that of activism, the ethics and professional responsibility 
literature seems to embrace the former as the more appropriate of the two.  
Lawyers are strongly advised to be zealous but neutral advocates of their 
clients’ interests.5  They also have a duty of loyalty to clients that may 
prohibit them from representing clients in cases where the attorney feels the 
pull of professional, personal or political interests distinct from those of the 
client.6
This raises significant ethical concerns for cause lawyers—activists 
lawyers who use the law as a means of creating social change in addition to 
a means of helping individual clients.  These lawyers are known by many 
names in the legal and sociological literature, including radical lawyers, 
critical lawyers, public interest lawyers, poverty lawyers, socially conscious 
lawyers, visionary lawyers, and so forth.7  The worry for the cause lawyer is 
that the pursuit of her “cause” may at times conflict with the client’s 
interest.  A lawyer’s professionalism is measured in part by her ability to  
keep her personal and political agendas apart from (and secondary to) her 
clients’ agendas.  Accordingly, the repeated cautions against conflicts of 
interest when representing clients8 suggest that lawyers ought be wary of 
non-client-centered goals in lawyering.  Tarlow’s particular  policy of not 
representing snitches is open to criticism on this ground,9 but is merely one 
example of an overall approach to criminal defense lawyering in which the 
attorney’s moral and political values play centrally in  her advocacy 
decisions.
In this Article— the first to seriously evaluate whether criminal 
defense lawyers are cause lawyers10— I consider several examples of cause 
lawyering as described by defense lawyers during the course of forty 
their skills with no sense of  accountability for the results and those who politicize their legal practice 
and use their skills to seek justice).
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MODEL 
RULES] (“A lawyer must also act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).
6. MODEL RULES, R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the 
interests of the client . . . .”); Model Rule, R. 1.7(b) (prohibiting lawyers from undertaking 
representations in which there is a conflict of interest with “another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer”).
7. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING:  POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 4, at 33.
8. See e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. § 9 (2003) (“In the nature of law practice, 
however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered.  Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from 
conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own 
interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.”).
9. There may be other grounds for disagreement with Tarlow’s approach.  It is not fully clear why 
Tarlow refuses to represent defendants who turn over state’s evidence.  Perhaps it is simply that he finds 
the decision to cooperate with law enforcement against others morally repulsive.  It may also be that he 
refuses to participate in cooperation agreements as a strategic stance against the practice of snitching, 
believing that the eradication of snitching would cripple law enforcement capabilities and help criminal 
defendants generally.  Tarlow would not be the first to adopt such a view.
10. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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interviews.  Through their discussions, I explore the types of values or 
commitments that animate defense lawyers’ approaches to the practice of 
law and the impact of such “cause lawyering” on the criminal defendant.  I 
consider whether the cause lawyering approach in the criminal context is 
compatible with ethical and professional rules and argue that it should be.  
Sometimes criminal defendants are better represented by defense attorneys 
who are “cause lawyers” passionately seeking to advance their political and 
moral visions through the representation of their clients than by attorneys 
who have no overriding  “cause” other than the representation of the 
individual client .  Ethical and professional norms should be more adaptive 
to these instances.
This paper then can be viewed as a challenge to the well-established 
view that favors neutrality or at the very least client-centrality as the only 
ethical approach to  lawyering.  I  provide empirical evidence supporting 
the contention that in many instances the cause lawyer’s approach is not 
only defensible but preferable.  My conclusion provides no quarrel with the 
notion that the defendant’s goals should take priority over the attorney’s 
personal or political goals.  Rather, I illustrate that the common formulation 
of the conflict-of-interest problem is oversimplified and unrealistic for the 
many criminal defense lawyers who are also cause lawyers.  The real 
conflict lies not between the client and the lawyer’s political interests but 
rather between this client’s interest and the interests of other clients that 
better embody the attorney’s larger moral or political cause.11  “Other 
clients” can be other current clients, other future clients or the class of 
criminal defendants generally.  This conflict, one that criminal defense 
attorneys and other cause lawyers face regularly, is the focus of this paper.
The Article proceeds in four parts.  In Parts I and II, I make the case 
that many  criminal defense attorneys are in fact cause lawyers—  lawyers 
who use their legal skills “to pursue ends and ideals that transcend client 
service.”12 Part I presents empirical evidence from a qualitative study of 
forty criminal defense attorneys.  Following a brief description of the 
project design and methodology, I describe the attorneys’ practices and 
attitudes about criminal defense and the reasons they choose it.  The 
11. Some cause lawyers are quick to discount these competing interests of individual clients as a 
real conflict and argue that priority is always given to the instant client.  See Susan Sterett, Caring About 
Individual Cases: Immigration Lawyering in Britain, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS 
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 4, at 239, 306 (citing a British immigration lawyer’s 
explanation that “[o]ne’s duty as a lawyer is to one’s client, not to the mass of other potential clients.  So 
if there’s a point you can get a result on your client on you have to pursue it.  You can’t say I won’t take 
this point because it might be worse for other people unless the client wants to adopt altruistic self-
sacrifice as part of his or her instructions to you.”).
12. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, 
PROFESSIONALISM AND CAUSE LAWYERING 3 (2004). The goals pursued by cause lawyers can be social, 
cultural, political, economic, or legal.  Id.
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interview data from this qualitative study reveal that many defense 
attorneys are motivated by a range of moral and political beliefs and that 
they practice in a manner consistent with those beliefs.  Part II provides a 
brief review of the scholarly literature on cause or public interest lawyering 
and its application to criminal defending.  Read together, Parts I and II 
leave little doubt that although criminal defense attorneys represent, almost 
by definition, individual clients in individual and unrelated cases, many are 
cause lawyers for whom law practice is “a deeply moral and political 
activity.”13 As Scheingold and Sarat put it in their recent book on cause 
lawyers, these are lawyers who “have something to believe in and bring 
their beliefs to work in their work lives.”14
Parts III and IV consider the ramifications of having cause lawyers 
practicing criminal defense.  In Part III, the heart of this paper, I consider 
the types of conflicts encountered by criminal defense attorneys precisely 
because they are working on behalf of causes in addition to working on 
behalf of individual clients.  The focus of this section is on conflicts 
encountered by criminal defense lawyers when the goals that they “believe 
in” are different and possibly (though not necessarily) incompatible with 
the immediate goals of their individual clients.  I explore in detail three 
conflicts mentioned repeatedly by the respondent attorneys: their decisions 
regarding whether to file Anders briefs informing the court that the 
defendant has no viable issues, the use of collective action by attorneys to 
challenge unfavorable Government policies, and decisions to forego making 
certain arguments on behalf of particular clients.  Part IV considers the 
question of whether criminal defendants are better off with cause lawyers or 
with non-partisan attorneys operating under the conventional approach of 
neutrality.  I conclude that contrary to conventional beliefs, defendants are 
not always better off when represented by criminal defense lawyers guided 
only by the formal dictates of the professional responsibility and ethics 
rules.  I argue that the formalistic approach to conflicts of interest embodied 
by the ethical and professional rules fails to take into account the reality of  
cause lawyering in general and criminal defense lawyering in particular.  
While the paper ultimately raises more questions than it can answer given 
the limited data, its purpose is to contribute to an important dialogue 
regarding the ethical regulation of cause lawyers.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id.
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I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL DEFENDERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS
This project emanates from an empirical study involving lengthy 
interviews of forty criminal defense attorneys.  An earlier component of this 
study had as its central aim the exploration of how the federal sentencing 
guidelines affect these lawyer’s perceived abilities to be successful 
advocates.15 Despite my own brief experience as a criminal defense 
attorney, I quickly learned that in constructing my inquiry, I had made 
certain assumptions about what it means to be a successful advocate and 
that these assumptions were not necessarily shared by many of the attorneys
being interviewed.  For many of the lawyers with whom I spoke, the 
requirements set forth by the ethics rules (that lawyers zealously pursue 
their individual client’s interests and objectives) were viewed as baseline or 
minimum requirements.16  Many of these lawyers had goals and 
motivations that were distinct from their client’s immediate objectives.  My 
interest is in these extra-curricular commitments and their effect on the 
enterprise of criminal defense lawyering.
Understanding these lawyer’s motivations, to the extent we can ever 
understand anyone’s motivations to do anything, helps to gain purchase on 
the question of whether criminal defense lawyers ought to be included 
within the category of “cause lawyers”.  After all, that which distinguishes 
cause lawyers from conventional lawyers is their intent and motivation to 
pursue social change.17  Although cause lawyers differ widely in their 
principles, ideologies, work settings and strategies, the essential and 
distinguishing feature that binds them is that they are drawn and motivated 
by moral and political commitments.18  To denominate a group of lawyers 
as cause lawyers, one must begin by understanding what motivates them 
and what they believe themselves to be about.  In the case of criminal 
defense lawyers, what are their motivations?
The issue of motivation in lawyering has been only marginally 
explored.  Yet, among the questions asked by scholars who study cause 
15. Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: 
an Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 430 (2004) (discussing “the extent to which criminal 
defense lawyers perceive that their advocacy decisions are influenced by the acceptance of responsibility 
determinations or other provisions of the Guidelines”).
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) (“A lawyer must . . . act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client . . . .”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980) (“A lawyer shall not intentionally . . . [f]ail to seek the lawful 
objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary 
Rules.”); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) (“The duty of a lawyer, both 
to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.”).
17. “Cause lawyering is associated with both intent and behavior.  Serving a cause by accident 
does not, in our judgment, qualify as cause lawyering.” SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 3.
18. Id. at 4.
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lawyering, the most intriguing have to do with the issue of motivation.  As 
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow asks, what motivates a lawyer to 
undertake work that is often poorly compensated and that may involve 
personal, physical, economic and status sacrifices in order to seek greater 
social justice?19  She laments that very little of the writing done on cause 
lawyering expressly considers the political, experiential and psychological 
roots of  its motivations.20
Even more under-examined are the motives of criminal defense 
lawyers and how these motives impact the way in which they do their jobs.  
An empirical examination of this small sample of criminal defense lawyers 
provides an illustrative though non-exhaustive list of some of the 
motivations that inspire and guide lawyers to seek social justice in the field 
of criminal law and policy.  The interview data from this study reveal a 
wide range of motives, as mixed and varied as the lawyers themselves.  
From this range of motives, several useful categories emerge: ideological 
motives, personality-based motives, experiential motives, ambition-oriented 
motives, and motives based on group identity.  While the causes for which 
criminal defense lawyers labor are as varied and mixed as the attorneys 
themselves, there are nonetheless some glaring commonalities revealed in 
the interviews of the defense attorneys.  In the section that follows I 
describe the design and results of the empirical study.21
A. Empirical Study
1. Data and Project Design
The data for this study is derived from in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with forty criminal defense attorneys who practice mostly or 
exclusively in federal court.  The forty attorneys are from one of two large 
and demographically diverse federal districts—in two different regions of 
the country22—and comprise a mix of public defenders and private 
attorneys.  Prior to each interview, the lawyers were told that neither their 
names nor the jurisdictions in which they practice would be revealed in the 
study.  This level of anonymity was intended to increase the responsiveness 
and comfort level of the subjects.  Each attorney interviewed was asked to 
fill out a short questionnaire prior to the interview.  The interviews, lasting 
approximately sixty to ninety minutes each, explored the subjects’ 
19. Id. at 37.
20. Id.
21. Some of the description of the study has been borrowed from an earlier Article on the federal 
sentencing guidelines involving the same subjects.  See Etienne, supra note 15, at 436-41.
22. I have omitted the specific jurisdictions in order to help preserve the anonymity of the 
respondent attorneys as well as the judges and prosecutors they mentioned.
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perceptions of themselves as advocates and the factors that they felt 
influenced their zealous representation of clients.  Each interview was 
audio-taped, transcribed and coded.23 While the interviews spanned various 
topics, each respondent was interviewed at some length about their 
motivations for doing the work they do.  Some of the questions asked in this 
vein are listed below in Figure 1.  (See Figure 1).
Figure 1
1. How would you characterize the goals of your 
job?
2. How do you determine what is the best result in 
any given case?
3. What are the kinds of things that the client gets 
to decide or that you decide and not the client?  
Are there such things?
4. How much control would you say that you have 
over how your cases develop?  Why?
5. Do you think that public defenders face 
different challenges than private attorneys from 
prosecutors, judges, or their clients?
6. To what extent are you ever in the position of 
having to worry about your reputation and 
credibility?
7. To what extent do your colleagues or other 
members of your defense bar influence what 
you think is appropriate for you to do as an 
advocate?
8. Is there a particular culture in this office as far 
as advocacy issues?
9. Since you’ve started defending, has the nature 
of the job changes?  How has it changed?
10. Is there anything about your background or 
training or values that you think significantly 
informs what kind of lawyer you are?
11. Why do you do this job?
12. Is there anything I haven’t asked that maybe I 
should have asked?  Any aspects of the work 
that you think bears on your ability to be an 
effective lawyer?
23. See Fig. 1, Interview Schedule 1.
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The lawyers for the study were identified in “snowball”24 fashion, 
starting initially with the federal public defender offices in each selected 
jurisdiction.  Each of the two defender offices I visited employs fifteen to 
twenty attorneys.25  I contacted each attorney in the public defender offices
by electronic mail or telephone seeking an interview.  From these attorneys, 
I obtained a response rate of approximately seventy percent.26  I began by 
interviewing all the attorneys who responded, with the exception of 
those who worked exclusively on appeals or habeas corpus cases.  I 
asked each respondent for the names of other criminal defense 
attorneys in that jurisdiction who might be willing to be interviewed.  
I maintained a list of lawyers whose names were mentioned by more 
than one respondent.  I contacted these individuals, often mentioning 
the lawyers who referred me, and obtained positive responses from 
approximately thirty percent of the snowballed subjects.
2. Respondent Demographics
Of the forty respondents interviewed in the study, approximately half 
were public defenders and half were private attorneys.  The lawyers ranged 
in experience and background.  Most of the lawyers interviewed have been 
practicing law between six and twenty-five years.  Three of the respondents 
have been practicing in federal court for five or fewer years and seven for 
more than twenty years.  A number of the lawyers had previously worked in 
law firms or government organizations doing civil or other non-criminal 
work, but most of them had done only criminal defense work during their 
careers.27  Three practiced for short stints as prosecutors.28  The respondents 
self-identified as 14 female, 26 male, 28 White or Caucasian, seven Black 
or African-American, three Hispanic, Latina/o or Mexican, and two Asian 
or Indian.  They ranged in age from twenty-five to sixty-three29 and 
24. Using a “snowball” or “chain” is one of several accepted methods of obtaining a reliable 
subject sample in qualitative research. It involves selecting an initial group of participants who help 
identify additional participants.  Snowballing allows the researcher to “identif[y] cases of interest from 
people who know people who know what cases are information-rich.” Id. at 119 (citing MATTHEW B. 
MILES & MICHAEL A. HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: A SOURCEBOOK OF NEW METHODS 
28 (2d ed. 1994)).
25. At the time of the study, one federal defender office employed 19 attorneys and the other 
employed 16 attorneys.  The private attorneys interviewed were either self-employed or worked in small 
firms.  Although a significant portion of the private attorney’s clients were privately retained, almost all 
the attorneys also handled court-appointed cases.
26. In approaching the lawyers, I told them very generally that I was conducting a study on the 
factors that influence defense attorney advocacy.  Most of the attorneys agreed to meet with me but there 
were several whose schedules did not coincide with mine.  Attorneys who declined to participate up 
front also cited trials, vacations or other scheduling conflicts.
27. Id.  See Figure 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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attended reputable law schools all over the country.  I obtained 
demographic information by having each attorney complete a short 
questionnaire prior to beginning the interviews.30  The questionnaire form 
appears below in Figure 2.
30. In addition to the interviews, each lawyer filled out a one page Questionnaire.  All 
questionnaires, as well as the transcripts from the interviews, are on file with the author.
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Figure 2
Some of the information from the preliminary questionnaires has been 
synthesized in Figure 3 to facilitate comparison.31
31. See Fig. 3, Table of Questionnaire Results.
Preliminary Questionnaire
Thank you for agreeing to meet with me for an interview.
Please fill out this preliminary information below prior to our 
interview.
ID# (interviewer use only)                        ____________________
Gender                                                         ____________________
Race                                                             ____________________
Age (optional)                                            ____________________
Number of years practicing law                ____________________
Law School                                                  ____________________
Number of years as a defense attorney   ____________________
Number of years as a prosecutor             _____________________
How would you characterize the goals of your job as a defense 
attorney?
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
Thanks for your time.
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Figure 3
Atty. Gender Race Age 
(Optional)
Yrs. 
Practicing 
Law
Yrs. 
Defense 
Atty.
Yrs. 
Prosecutor
Private 
Atty./Pub. 
Defender
A1 Male Caucasian 35 9 9 0 Public
A2 Male African-American 35 10 6 0 Public
A3 Female Caucasian 40 7 7 0 Public
A4 Male Caucasian 34 7 ½ 7 ½ 0 Public
A5 Male Caucasian 45 12 12 0 Public
A6 Female African-American 37 1 9 0 Public
A7 Male African-American 42 17 15 0 Private
A8 Male Caucasian 49 23 18 0 Public
A9 Female Hispanic 37 12 8 0 Public
A10 Female Caucasian 44 19 9 Never! Public
A11 Female Caucasian 39 16 14 0 Private
A12 Female African-American 38 6 5 0 Private
A13 Female Caucasian 36 12 12 0 Private
A14 Male African-American 52 24 23 0 Private
A15 Male Caucasian 52 25 15 10 Private
A16 Male Caucasian 51 27 23 0 Private
A17 Male Caucasian 36 9 6 0 Private
A18 Male Caucasian 59 30 25 5 Private
A19 Female Caucasian 43 14 14 0 Private
A20 Male Caucasian 40 14 13 0 Public
A21 Female Asian 32 5 4 0 Public
A22 Male White 40 8 ½ 8 1/2 0 Public
A23 Male White 44 16 16 0 Public
A24 Male African-American 31 6 3 0 Public
A25 Male Hispanic 48 24 24 0 Public
A26 Female White 41 4 ½ 4 1/2 0 Public
A27 Female Black 25 5 months 5 months 0 Public
A28 Female White 53 27 27 0 Public
A29 Male Indian Subcontinent Blank 15 12 0 Public
A30 Male White 28 1 ½ 1 1/2 0 Private
A31 Male White/Hispanic 43 13 13 0 Public
A32 Male White 52 27 27 blank Private
A33 Male White 43 18 18 0 Public
A34 Female White 32 6 4 0 Public
A35 Male White 48 23 ½ 23 1/2 0 Private
A36 Male White 43 18 18 0 Private
A37 Male White 51 26 16 10 Private
A38 Male White 57 31 27 4 Private
A39 Male White 63 34 30 0 Private
A40 Female White 54 23 20 0 Private
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The sample of lawyers in this study is not designed to be statistically 
representative of the federal defense bar or of the specific jurisdictions 
visited.  As with most qualitative empirical studies,32 my goal was not to 
conduct a randomized survey but to obtain a nuanced understanding of 
defense lawyers’ motivations for doing the work they do.  Interviews play a 
critical role in qualitative empirical studies because they provide nuances 
and explanations that are difficult to obtain from quantitave or statistical 
analysis.33  I expect that this study will broaden our understanding of cause 
lawyers in general and our sense of the cause for which criminal defense 
attorneys labor.
3. Preliminary Findings
As noted above, data were in the form of semi-structured interviews.  
The interviews focused on sentencing practices and defense attorney 
advocacy in the context of sentencing.  As the attorneys explained their 
practices and strategies as advocates, they revealed many of the underlying 
values that animate their decisions.  After gathering the interview data, I 
combed the transcripts to identify and categorize the factors they said 
motivated their conduct.  Attorneys explained that they were motivated by: 
(1) their desire to achieve the “best result” for clients, (2) their interest in 
securing procedural fairness— as opposed to specific results— for clients, 
(3) their optimistic worldview about human nature,34 (4) their belief in 
giving others the benefit of the doubt, (5) their commitment to equal justice 
for the poor, minorities, and the disadvantaged, (6) their “social worker” 
sensibilities, (7) their opposition to sentencing and prison policies, their 
32. Although this methodology is used predominantly by sociologists, similar studies have 
appeared in other legal journals. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (1975) (explaining that the usefulness of qualitative studies lies 
not in obtaining a scientific measure of a problem but in helping to “guide analysis and to permit an 
evaluation of the inherency of the problems”); Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 52 &  n.15 (1968) (describing the study as “legal journalism” with 
particular analytic utilities rather than a scientific survey); Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and 
the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 278-79 (2001) (reporting that his 
qualitative study, consisting of interviews of thirty-nine attorneys, was conducted with the goal of in-
depth exploration of case selection, management, and settlement strategies rather than arrival at a 
quantitative measure of specific variables); Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain 
After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside The Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 421 (1999) (explaining that 
the small sample studied—twenty nuisance cases—is useful in generalizing about the types of problems 
encountered if not in measuring the extent of the problem).
33. Interviews play a critical role in data collection in grounded theory studies. It is recommended 
that grounded theorists interview twenty to thirty respondents in order to develop a reliable model or 
theory with adequate categorization of findings and adequately categorize these findings.  See JOHN W. 
CRESWELL, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY AND RESEARCH DESIGN:  CHOOSING AMONG FIVE TRADITIONS 56 
(1998).
34. I take this to be indicative of either a tendency to believe in innocence (until proven guilty) or 
to believe in rehabilitation as a goal of punishment.
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desire to fight government overreaching and law enforcement corruption, 
(8) their respect for and desire to be respected by their colleagues in the 
defense bar, (9) their belief in the adversarial justice system, (10) the 
excitement of and opportunity for first-hand criminal litigation, (11) their 
feelings of identification with their clients, and (12) the financial 
compensation.
From these twelve broad categories, I identified those that relate to 
cause lawyering.  The result was six more specific categories of motives: 
(1) the goal of securing fairness or procedural rights for those accused of 
crimes, (2) the desire to effectuate broader criminal justice reform, (3) 
providing an opportunity for disempowered defendants to have their day in 
court or have their voices heard, (4) helping defendants improve their lives 
through advice, counseling and tapping into resources, much like a social 
worker, (5) identification with clients’ needs because of lawyer’s particular 
background or experiences such as religion, race, ethnicity, and (possibly) 
gender, (6) a shared view among defense lawyers leading to the 
development of an influential group network and inter-group pressures.  A 
seventh category was created for miscellaneous motives that did not 
correspond into any of the six described above.  These themes were used as 
a framework with which to code the forty interviews.  The coding involved 
a verbatim reading of interview transcripts, studying each text line by line, 
and highlighting statements falling within the noted themes. The section 
that follows focuses on these recurring themes raised by the respondents in 
discussing their “causes” and the factors that motivate them.
B. Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers: A Look at Motivations
During the course of the interviews, I began to focus on lawyer 
“motivations” in at least two senses of the word.  I investigated the factors 
that lead lawyers to choose criminal defending as well as those that 
influence lawyers’ approaches in how they do their jobs.  I concluded that 
these motivations are best understood by viewing criminal defense 
attorneys as a distinctive breed of cause lawyers.
Motivations are notoriously difficult to discern.  For every action, 
there are likely several influential motivations.  The same is true for the 
motives of criminal defenders. Moreover, the motives that lead some 
attorneys to choose a career as a cause lawyer is often different from the 
motives that lead them to remain in these difficult and often poorly paid 
careers.  Additionally, the “motives” inquiry is further complicated because 
its respondents hear one of two distinct questions.  There is the “what 
motivated you to become a cause lawyer” question and the “what goals 
motivate your work” question.  The conflation of the two is understandable 
13984-TEXT.NATIVE.1111093852 3/18/2005 2:33 PM
16 ETIENNE
because in many instances, a single motivating factor (e.g., outrage over 
police brutality,  opposition to unfair treatment of poor and minorities) 
answers both questions.  For example, a lawyer’s desire to eradicate police 
brutality may be both her inspiration and her goal.  Thus when I refer to 
motives I refer both to the motivators that serve as the lawyers’ inspirations 
as well as their goals.35  The data shows that few of the lawyers interviewed 
were influenced by a single cause or motive.  Instead many of them echoed 
variations of the twelve previously outlined “motives.”  I consider the wide 
mix of motives in greater detail below.
It is worth noting at this juncture that although this paper has as its 
focus an examination of criminal defense lawyers as cause lawyers, the data 
obtained from the interviews may also be valuable as an independent 
contribution to other areas of scholarship.36  Understanding lawyer motives 
is also relevant to a host of policy concerns and proposals including the 
regulation of lawyers, the encouragement or requirement of pro bono legal 
work, the recruitment and admission policies of law schools.
From the perspective of the cause lawyering scholarship, the data 
reveals most notably several commonalities among respondents.  The first 
commonality noted from the study is that criminal defense lawyers seem to 
have a shared ideology or worldview37 that oddly combines skepticism of 
government action with an admiration of its underlying principles.  Many 
(public) defense attorneys embody the seemingly contradictory position of 
working for the government, against the prosecutorial arm of the 
government in order to protect what they perceive to be the integrity of a 
governmental system of criminal justice.  Their principal cause seems to be 
a dedication to fighting governmental tyranny and abuse.  Variations of this 
include a strong desire to help the underdog or to protect the disadvantaged 
members of society.  Second, the respondent attorneys generally believe 
that the process of representation is nearly as important as the result.  They 
want the experiences of their clients to be as minimally traumatic as 
possible. This requires that the attorneys make great efforts to ensure that 
35. It’s not surprising that “cause” can have both a consequential significance as in “causation” 
and the meaning of “purpose” as in this is “my cause.’  See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d. ed. 
1989) (defining “cause” as  “1. That which produces an effect; that which gives rise to any action, 
phenomenon, or condition. Cause and effect are correlative terms. . . . 3. A fact, condition of matters, or 
consideration, moving a person to action; ground of action; reason for action, motive”).
36. The insights and findings from this qualitative study are at the intersection of the sociology of 
professions literature, the application of behavioral law and economics to principal and agent problems, 
and the law of professional responsibility.
37. See Transcript of Interview with Attorney 36 at 19 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of 
A36].  Attorney 36 is a private attorney who sees a great deal of similarity among the federal public 
defenders across the country.  He explains, “I’ve gotten to know a lot of people in federal defenders 
offices around the country that way and most of ‘em are exactly the same and they’re just really really 
good people who know the law well.”  Id.
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their clients feel informed, respected and empowered throughout the 
process.  Most of the attorneys expressing this view discussed their desire to 
“help people” and are committed to the improvement of the lives of 
individual clients.  And third, the lawyers studied tend to share a group 
identity with other criminal defenders and behave as though they are part of 
a movement or social agenda of legal reform that transcends their individual 
cases.  The goal of this movement appears to be to change the way the law 
treats the criminally accused.  The lawyers had a “soldier” mentality and 
were as devoted to their roles as part of a network of criminal defense 
lawyers as they were to the changes they sought to promote.
The vast majority of the respondent lawyers began by explaining that 
the primary goal of their representation was to “help” the client or to obtain 
“the best result.”38  For most attorneys, the best result was always an 
acquittal or the lowest possible sentence.  But many attorneys realized early 
on that those goals were often difficult to attain and were not directly within 
their control.39  As one lawyer explained, even when he does not win, “ in 
those cases where even someone’s life has been influenced in some small 
fashion by how I’ve litigated a case, I feel good.”40 Therefore, in 
conjunction with winning or reducing the length of confinement, the 
attorneys articulated numerous other goals of representation.  These 
additional goals help elucidate these lawyers’ attitudes and beliefs about 
their roles as defense attorneys.
38. See Questionnaire from Interview with Attorney 22 (Mar. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Questionnaire 
from A22]; Questionnaire from Interview with Attorney 9 (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Questionnaire 
from A9] (noting that a goal of criminal defense work is to “help others”); Questionnaire from Interview 
with Attorney 5 (Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Questionnaire from A5] (explaining a goal of the job as 
doing “whatever I can to help my clients”); see also Transcript of Interview with Attorney 34 at 1 (Apr. 
21, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A34] (“the best result is figuring out what it is that the client wants 
and working toward that.”); Transcript of Interview with Attorney 27 at 1 (Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter 
Transcript of A27] (dealing with how the “best” result takes into account other circumstances of the 
individuals life); Transcript of Interview with Attorney 25 at 1 (Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of 
A25] (“And hopefully you know when they’re done with me not only will they have the best possible 
legal position that they can have, but they’ll also be better people for it because they will have addressed 
the causes of their behavior.”).
39. See, e.g., Transcript of A25, supra note 38 (“In federal criminal law, the control that you have 
over . . . the end result . . . is not very great because we have the Guidelines and basically everybody gets 
pigeonholed into certain . . . Guidelines.”).  Generally, attorneys decried their own disempowerment as 
lawyers under the federal scheme.  They described feeling powerless as advocates in the face of 
tremendously high stakes in which prosecutors “hold [all] the cards.”  Transcript of Interview with 
Attorney 11 (June 12, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A11].  As one respondent put it, the job of the 
defense attorney has been reduced to “professional begging.”  Id.; see also Transcript of Interview with 
Attorney 10 (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A10] (explaining that “I feel like I have very 
limited power, as far as negotiations go. . .”).  Many of the lawyers felt that they had been co-opted into 
the prosecutorial system and that their role was reduced to “helping them make the trains run on time.”  
Transcript of A11, supra; cf. Transcript of A25, supra note 39 (“Attorneys can still make a difference 
under the right circumstances.”).
40. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 33 at 14 (Apr. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A33].
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1. Procedural Rights and Fairness
The lawyers believed that they were there to guarantee that the 
procedural rights of their clients were not trampled upon.41  Many of the 
attorneys felt that even if their clients were convicted and received 
significant sentences, they would have done a good job if they insured that 
their clients enjoyed all the procedural safeguards to which they were 
entitled under the law.  A related point often articulated by the respondents 
was that they stood prepared to hold the government to its burden of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  In many of the interviews, the 
lawyers described their work as upholding individual rights and liberties, or 
“constitutional rights.” 42
Related to the notion of procedural fairness is the idea that every party 
in a litigation action deserves a strong and dedicated advocate.  These 
lawyers are believers in our criminal justice system and see themselves as 
the embodiment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.43  Without the 
right to effective advocacy, other constitutional rights would be less 
meaningful.44  To many of the lawyers interviewed, the belief that a good 
41. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 32 at 17 (Apr. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A32] 
(explaining that “these rights are the foundation of this entire country and that these rights are something 
to cherish”).
42. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 23 (Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Transcript of A23]; see 
also Transcript of A33, supra note 40, at 2 (“OK you’ve got a constitutional right to have a lawyer 
defend you and defending you meant fighting a case and making the government prove it’s case beyond 
a reasonable doubt, challenging the evidence, putting the client on the stand, testifying that the cops said 
things or did things that influenced the evidence in the case.”); Transcript of Interview with Attorney 29 
at 8 (Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A29] (discussing how fifth amendment rights run the risk 
of being infringed upon when prosecution teams get to defendants before defense attorneys do); 
Transcript of A27, supra note 39, at 17 (“So that’s something that really drives me in terms of 
continuing to do this work, because I really feel like that’s something that people have the right, so that’s 
a really. . .its really rights.”); Transcript of A23, supra, at 17 (discussing the client’s right to an appeal); 
id. at 11 (“My feeling though is that if I’ve got to suppress a motion that I think is a legitimate 
suppression motion, you know, an illegal search, let’s say. . .I think you have a good argument to make 
that by challenging that, you’re not expressing a lack of acceptance o responsibility, you have a legal 
right to challenge that.”).
43. Transcript of A27, supra note 38, at 17 (“[I]t’s always in my belief that people do, they have 
that right to be effectively represented. So that’s something that really drives me in terms of continuing 
to do this work.”); Transcript of Interview with Attorney 24 at 5 (Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript 
of A24] (“[P]eople who can’t afford a ‘paid attorney’ should ultimately feel at the end of the day that ‘if 
I paid this person I wouldn’t expect him to do any more than they’d done.’”).
44. See MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS 13-42 (1990) (“An essential
function of the adversary system . . . is to maintain a free society in which individual rights are central. 
In that sense, the right to counsel is the most pervasive of rights because it affects the client’s ability to 
assert all other rights.”) (citation omitted); see also Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”); Transcript of A27, supra note 
38, at 17 (“I see such a definite need for people who just don’t have the resources to be able to hire an 
attorney, to in still be able to be provided with effective assistance of counsel, not just counsel, but 
actually effective assistance of counsel.  People who will actually investigate the case and keep them 
informed of what’s going on.”).
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defense attorney for the accused is a critical aspect of a strong criminal 
justice system motivates them to do the job.
2. Criminal Justice Reform
A number of the respondent attorneys described themselves as 
fighters.45  They fight convictions or harsher sentences for their clients, to 
be sure, but they also fight the system.  The two “fights” were viewed as 
symbiotic.  For these lawyers, the criminal justice system was badly in need 
of repair in one way or another.  The ills they sought to combat included 
police violence, law enforcement corruption, racism, overly harsh 
sentencing policies, prosecutorial abuses, and court processes and 
procedures that are unduly partial to the prosecution.  All of these are 
causes that could be championed during the process of representing 
individual defendants.46
The ultimate goal for the lawyers seeking to reform the criminal justice 
system is either to change the law as it is written or as it is applied.  Some 
lawyers target specific cases or statutes that they believe ought to be 
overturned and work toward that goal, much like cause lawyers in other 
fields work steadily toward a long-term goal of eradicating the death 
penalty, legalizing gay marriage or desegregating schools.  Other lawyers 
identify certain practices such as racial profiling, automatic detention for 
certain crimes or mandatory minimum sentences and seek to challenge 
those.  These criminal defense attorneys engage in what is often referred to 
as impact litigation but they use their criminal defense work as the medium 
through which they seek change.
Evidence of this was most stark when talking to lawyers about 
deciding when to pursue and when to forego certain legal arguments.  Their 
decisions were often based not solely on the best interest of the client but 
with an eye on the effect it would have on the law.  Some lawyers discussed 
their decisions to withhold certain arguments for fear of making “bad law”47
while others combed favorable appellate cases in other districts in order to 
bring “good law” into their own district when the right case came along.  As 
45. Transcript of A33, supra note 40 (explaining that criminal defending “mean[s] fighting a 
case”).
46. See, e.g., Transcript of A34, supra note 38, at 7 (“I think that the criminal enforcement in 
general, specifically federal enforcement, is profoundly unfair:  It’s motivated by interests that are 
inappropriate for this kind of setting. I think that the criminal law targets the wrong people, and it targets 
certain people.”).
47. Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 8 (“I am a big believer in not fighting bad guidelines 
issues. . .I’m really wandering on thin ice, we may have a little bit of an argument, but it’s really thin 
ice. Because I think you lose a certain amount of credibility when the judge can come in and say, ‘Okay, 
there was an abuse of trust here.’ I think you gain a certain level of credibility, so on the other issues that 
you may really fight out, you’re better off.”).
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one lawyer put it, “You know, there I think it is a responsibility not just to 
the client but to make some good law . . . to litigate . . . out of a sense of 
responsibility to the system that would do things the right way.” 48  For the 
most part, these lawyers perceived themselves as agents of legal reform and 
believed that their roles as criminal defenders transcended the specific 
benefits their advocacy afforded individual clients.
One noteworthy aspect of the criminal defense lawyer’s desire to 
influence socio-legal reform is what appears as, unfortunately, anti-
governmentalism.49 Indeed, many defense lawyers describe themselves as 
“fighting the government”50 and “making the government prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”51 It is probably more accurate to say that 
criminal defense lawyers are not anti-government but rather are anti-
government misconduct or abuse.52  They see the potential for government 
abuse in all stages of the criminal justice system: political pandering by the 
legislature, misconduct by the police, selectiveness and vindictiveness by 
prosecutors, arbitrariness and bias by judges, harsh and inhumane 
conditions imprisons, and so forth.  These lawyers do not see themselves as 
defending the criminally accused per se but are committed to defending 
“the little guy” against each and every perceived manifestation of 
governmental overstepping.53
3. Giving The Defendant A Voice And Ownership Over Process
Although defense lawyers want to obtain substantive results for their 
clients, they noted that sometimes defendants also have the need for a 
48. See Transcript of Interview with Attorney 37 at 11 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of 
A37].
49. Many of the criminal defense lawyers were overwhelmingly on the political left and do not 
seem to oppose “big government” in other contexts as do those on the political right.  Some of these 
lawyers were arguably libertarians.
50. Transcript of A34, supra note 38, at 7 (“I feel very strongly that no matter how frustrating it 
may be and how often we may lose, it is worth it to put up a fight.”); Transcript of Interview with 
Attorney 31 at 5 (Apr. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A31] (“[O]ftentimes we had fights . . . with 
the government.”); see also Transcript of Interview with Attorney 28 at 17 (Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter 
Transcript of A28] (talking about how sometimes what the defense attorney must “fight” against is 
demoralizing).
51. Transcript of A33, supra note 40.
52. Transcript of A32, supra note 41, at 1 (“I feel it’s very important that there be a check on the 
government and the only way that check can be effective is if I do my job to the best of my ability.”); 
see also Transcript of A33, supra note 40, at 4 (giving an example about how it is the role of the defense 
attorney to make certain that constitutional violations like unreasonable searches do not get maneuvered 
around at trial).
53. Transcript of A28, supra note 50, at 7 (“I think the systemic harm is enormous . . . . The body 
of case law in the sentencing guidelines is exclusively intended to be based upon the law and judges are 
supposed to look for the heartland in the law . . . only the cases that they see are the cases that the 
prosecutors choose to have them, which means that we don’t have a heartland.  We have a core group of 
cases created by the government.” ).
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process that allows them to express themselves—their defenses, their 
concerns, their fears and their remorse.  Not surprisingly, some of the 
attorneys cited that a primary goal was to ensure that the client received her 
“day in court.”54  This goal can be difficult to accomplish because few 
defendants ever testify in court.55  Accordingly, defense lawyers are the 
principal vehicle through which defendants can have their voices heard.56
For example, one lawyer explained that he gave clients great latitude in 
making decisions about the case and about the strategies to be used even 
when he had doubts about the client’s chosen strategy; it was important for 
the client to feel a sense of ownership over the case since it was the client 
and not the attorney who would have to live with the result.57  This lawyer
gave the example of a client who insisted that the lawyer call a particular 
witness to the stand even though the lawyer doubted that the witness’s 
testimony would be helpful.  Other lawyers gave examples dealing with 
making particular arguments or motions before the court even when they 
were certain that the motion would fail.  One lawyer stated that sometimes 
you have to put on a show for a clients: they “appreciate[d] their story being 
put forth even though they knew the chances of winning were very, very 
low.”58  One lawyer gave as an example that she might make a lengthy and 
heartfelt argument in favor of releasing a defendant on bond even when 
experience dictates that the likelihood of a bond is slim to none.  She related 
her response to the judges who questioned why she would make the 
argument:
[J]udges later tell me, you know I can’t release them, why are you 
making that argument? My response to the judge is I have to put up a 
good show for my clients so they sense that I am fighting for them. The 
54. Id. at 1 (explaining that sometimes defendants express needs other than getting the best 
sentence and oftentimes told lawyers: “I need [m]y day in court.  I don’t care what the evidence is.  I 
need the government to understand why this happened.”).
55. As one attorney explained, “I don’t think I have ever put a client on the witness stand.”  
Transcript of Interview with Attorney 5 at 1 (Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A5].  For a more 
detailed discussion of why clients rarely testify in federal court, see generally Etienne, supra note 15, at 
458-61.
56. See Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 21 (discussing how ultimately a defense attorney 
should serve as a vehicle for letting the defendant’s voice be heard).
57. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 21 at 3 (Mar. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A21] (“I 
personally present a lot of [decisions] to the client as their rights, even if it is not technically, legally, 
their right alone to make.  Or their choice alone to make.  Even if I know that there are some instances 
where as the lawyer I can make the strategic decision to do something, I tend to try to get them on board 
or to make that decision themselves.  I think that is the only way that really, they are truly assisting in 
their defense.”); see also Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 3 (“And if we disagree, I’ll tell you if I 
think you’re making a choice that’s not wise, I’ll tell you why, I just won’t tell you it’s a bad decision, 
I’ll tell you why I think it’s a bad decision, but ultimately you’re going to make those decisions.”).
58. Transcript of A37, supra note 48, at 2.
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judge knows it is a frivolous argument, and I know it as well, but it is an 
argument that I will make anyway.59
The lawyers who were proponents of the defendant’s “day in court” 
rationale in justifying their work stressed that the criminal justice process 
can be particularly dehumanizing for defendants, whether or not they are 
guilty.60  They saw it as an important part of their job to humanize the 
defendant and help her feel a sense of ownership in the process. 61  As one 
lawyer explained, “I’m a criminal defense lawyer because I like to represent 
people [as] individuals.”62
4. The Social Worker Model: Providing Resources
While some attorneys sought to minimize “the impact of the criminal 
justice system” on the lives of their clients63, others wanted to use the 
defendant’s contact with authorities to help defendants bring change into 
their lives.64  Most criminal defendants are underprivileged.  Three-fourths 
of them are indigent and qualify for appointed counsel.65  Many that do not 
qualify are nonetheless of modest means and may not have access to 
necessary resources.  As one lawyer explained, whatever else happens in 
the case, my involvement is an opportunity to help the client obtain 
resources that she might not have received otherwise.  These lawyers assist 
their clients in “accessing any community resources” that might help them 
bring change to their lives.66  Examples of such resources included drug 
rehabilitations, skills, housing, medical assistance, psychological 
counseling67, or other benefits.  At least one attorney explicitly recognized 
59. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 9 at 12 (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A9].
60. Transcript of A28, supra note 50, at 1.
61. Transcript of A29, supra note 42, at 11 (“My training here was really good in terms of 
humanizing.”); see also Transcript of A31, supra note 50, at 2; Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 3; 
Transcript of A21, supra note 57, at 3.
62. Transcript of Attorney 40 at 1 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A40] (“I’m a criminal 
defense lawyer because I like to represent people [as] individuals.”).
63. Id.  This attorney added: “[For] most of the people who I have ever represented it is their first 
time.  That’s not to say everyone is a first time offender, but most people are.  And in my experience 
most people do not circle back through the system.  And if you can minimize for them the adverse 
consequences, of their involvement with this system, and at the same time maximize their, or you know, 
you just need to lessen the aggravation for them.”  Id.; see also Transcript of A33, supra note 40, at 1 
(“[I]n the event they want to fight the case [we help] them prepare to fight it as best as we can.  And 
number two, [we do] it in a way that minimizes the damage to their lives.”).
64. Transcript of A25, supra note 38, at 2 (“I think that beyond getting that not guilty verdict it’s 
the greatest satisfaction to see somebody straighten out their lives.”).
65. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1763 (1993).
66. Questionnaire from Interview with Attorney 3 (Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Questionnaire from 
A3].
67. See, e.g., Transcript of A40, supra note 62, at 2 (“[Y]ou have now a lot of people with mental 
health issues, not only in nursing homes, but in the county jails.”); Transcript of A25, supra note 38, at 1 
(“And hopefully you know when they’re done with me . . . they’ll also be better people for it because 
they will have addressed the causes of their behavior . . . if they need a drug program, alcoholic 
13984-TEXT.NATIVE.1111093852 3/18/2005 2:33 PM
2005] CRIMINAL DEFENDERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS 23
that she had adopted a social worker’s approach to her job.68  It was 
knowing that she could make a difference in this way that motivated her to 
do criminal defense work and it was one part of the job in which she felt 
she had a lasting impact when all else was said and done.
5. Experience and Identity as Motivations
a. Religious Worldview
When asked why they do the work they do, a number of attorneys 
discussed their personal values and worldviews.69  One recurring theme to 
these answers was a fundamental belief in about how to relate to those less 
fortunate.  One lawyer explained that she tried to extend the golden rule—
that is treat others in the way you want to be treated— to her work in 
representing criminal defendants.70  Another explained that he believed in 
forgiveness and that everyone deserved a second chance.71  It was this 
principle that led him to choose criminal defense work and that gave him 
comfort as he fought for the rights of criminal defendants.  Criminal 
defense work was described by one attorney as “God’s work” because it 
involved the unpopular choice of coming to the aid of society’s outcasts.72
program . . . . I love to do that kind of thing.  One of the greatest satisfactions I get out of this job is that 
later on in your life . . . like years after you’re done with the client you’ll get a card saying how great 
they’re doing . . . they’re supporting their family, they’ve done their programs, they’re clean, they’re 
working and they’re being a positive influence in their neighborhood.”).
68. Transcript of A33, supra note 40, at 1 (“[I]t’s just sort of been . . . a social work aspect of being 
a lawyer that I, I think has become . . . the way that I approach my job.  Every case is different and the 
needs of every person charged are different.”); see also Transcript of Interview with Attorney 22 at 2-3 
(Mar. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A22] (giving an example of an instance in which, contrary to 
the wishes of the defendant, the attorney convinced the judge to let the individual stay with her father as 
opposed to with her grandmother because it was, in the attorney’s eyes, a better place for her); 
Transcript of Interview with Attorney 12 (June 12, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A12] (explaining 
lawyer’s role in helping client to find a guardian for her children).
69. See, e.g., Transcript of Interview with Attorney 39 at 13 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript 
of A39] (“I think it’s just a philosophy of life.  You know, that you um, there’s just something about not 
being a bully and I think most of the time prosecutors are bullies.”); Transcript of A27, supra note 38, at 
17 (centering values around the importance of a presumption of innocence and citing upbringing as 
being pivotal in creating this worldview); Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 24 (feeling that it is 
supremely important to help the “underdog”); Transcript of A22, supra note 68 at 18 (realting to “the 
damned” and wanting to help the “down-trodden”); Transcript of A21, supra note 57, at 25 (feeling that 
it is important to provide a client with “a sense of justice”).
70. See Transcript of Interview with Attorney 6 at 22 (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of 
A6] (explaining that attorney did not like to file Anders briefs— briefs notifying the appeals court that 
there are no meritorious issues— because it was inconsistent with the “golden rule”).
71. See, e.g., Transcript of Interview with Attorney 14 at 2-4 (June 13, 2003) [hereinafter 
Transcript of A14] (discussing the goal of giving clients another chance at life).
72. Transcript of A25, supra note 38, at 1 (beleiving that working as a criminal defense attorney is 
like “God’s work” in the sense that it is possible to incite “positive social change” and deal with the 
“roots” of problems).
13984-TEXT.NATIVE.1111093852 3/18/2005 2:33 PM
24 ETIENNE
Some of these lawyers are like many lawyers whose choice and manner of 
work are influenced by their religious beliefs.73
b. Experiential and Personal Background
Aside from these dogmatic and theological explanations, some lawyers 
simply credited their penchant for criminal defense work with personality, 
childhood background or culture.  A lawyer who described himself as an 
optimist, felt that it was generally his tendency to want to “fight for the 
underdog.”74  Another explained that he believed that everyone deserved 
“the benefit of the doubt” and so it was easy for him to translate this 
personal view into a legal career as a defender.75
Attorney background also played a role in their career choices.  
Interestingly, both lawyers with financially privileged families76 and those 
from poor or troubled families cited their backgrounds as motivating forces 
for them.77  One lawyer noted that the fact that he grew up with so many 
more advantages than a lot of other people may have been a factor drawing 
him to a career of helping those who were less fortunate.78 Another 
explained that when she looked at some of her clients she thought “that
could have been me or my brother.”79  In explaining the kind of lawyers she 
73. This emerging view of lawyering is thoroughly explored during a symposium conference at 
Fordham Law School.  See Symposium, The Relevance of Religion To a Lawyer’s Work: An Interfaith 
Conference, 66 FORDHAM L.REV. 1075 (1998).
74. Transcript of A39, supra note 69, at 13 (answering in the affirmative that he liked to “root for 
the underdog”); Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 24 (“I sort of identify with the underdog, there’s no 
bigger underdogs than the people we represent.”).
75. See Transcript of A27, supra note 38, at 17 (“Even when people ask you now, they say, ‘Oh, 
you represent criminals.’ So that’s automatically that assumption that’s out there . . . that’s what you’re 
already working with countering.”).
76. Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 25 (“I came from an upper-middleclass, white-suburban 
background . . . primarily different from my clients—it’s significantly different than my clients. But 
somewhere along the line the lesson was taught to me that the only reason I was where I was is because 
I had . . . was blessed with enormous opportunities that other people of equal or greater intellect were 
not presented with.”).
77. See, e.g., Transcript of A32, supra note 41, at 19 (“I have a brother who ran away from 
home . . . when he was young so I haven’t talked to him in . . . 15 years[.]”); Transcript of Interview 
with Attorney 18 at 15 (June 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A18] (“I grew up, in you know, kind of 
a tough neighborhood . . . in North New Jersey.”).
78. Transcript of A32, supra note 41, at 18 (“I really feel that I was almost like born with it.  You 
know, I can remember as a little kid . . . I just always felt like some people were getting a raw deal.  I 
was in my grammar school was mixed, you know racial background and everything and . . . I went to a 
party when I was like in 3rd grade and a girl that I was crazy about [who] was black and I went there and 
I just said something is not right here . . . . [She] lived in a poor area and I just I didn’t understand it.”); 
see also Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 25.
79. Transcript of A6, supra note 70, at 4 (“[I] look at them like I would as a loved one, not just as 
putting myself in the shoes of a client, but also pretending that that is my brother or my sister.”); cf. 
Transcript of Interview with Attorney 19 at 11 (June 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A19] 
(“explaining that if ever in the defendant’s position, he would want an attorney who “would be looking 
at my life like it was either their life or their children’s life”).
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sought to hire, one supervising attorney remarked that she looked for people 
with a “recognized commitment to working with people in poverty or some 
kind of special needs, who have a recognized commitment to helping 
others.” 80
c. Racial and Ethnic Identification
The feeling of identification with the plight of the criminal defendants 
was especially common among minority-race attorneys.  The African-
American and Latino/-a lawyers in particular discussed their feelings of 
connectedness to their clients, who were also predominantly African-
American or Latino/-a.  A number of these lawyers said that  their work was 
an opportunity to repay a debt to their communities.81
It is not uncommon to find that minority attorneys lean toward 
criminal defense work.  Historically, criminal law was the bread and butter 
practice of most African-American lawyers.82  African-American lawyers 
catered almost exclusively to African-American clients in a sharply 
segregated America.  Because blacks were systematically excluded from 
many commercial enterprises, they had fewer commercial legal needs.  
However, blacks and other minorities have not been excluded from the 
reach of criminal laws, as criminal laws have always played an important 
role in controlling all sorts of behavior (including traditionally non-criminal 
behavior) in minority and impoverished communities.83
80. Transcript of A28, supra note 50, at 5 (“I look for somebody who’s willing to learn, who 
seems to be passionate about the idea of doing the work, probably not the work ‘cause they’ve probably 
not done much of it . . . who has recognized commitment to working with people in poverty or some 
kind of special needs, who have a recognized commitment to helping others.”).
81. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 15 at 3 (June 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A15] 
(“[If] they’re . . .  school teachers or people who live in my community and if it’s something in state 
court or misdemeanor court . . . I’ll just represent them for free.”).  The attorney went on to state:  “[I]t 
was a great way to learn you know, and a great way to serve the community at the same time and getting 
professional enjoyment.”  Id. at 23-24.
82. Aaron Porter, Norris, Schmidt, Green, Harris, Higginbothom & Associates: The Sociological 
Import of Philadelphia Cause Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 4, at 162.
83. See e.g., Ahmed White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the Regulation of 
Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 671, 674-86 (2004) (discussing generally the 
history of American policing after Reconstruction as a means of controlling poor and working class 
people and describing vagrancy laws in particular as a means of regulating labor and imposing a work 
ethic ideology).
It is not surprising that many of the most famous civil rights cases sprang from criminal 
matters.  See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (known also as the Scottsboro Boys Case) 
(reversing rape convictions and death sentences of eight African –American boys on Fourteenth 
Amendment due process grounds); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896) (affirming Petitioner  
Plessy’s arrest and conviction under Louisiana law that provided “for separate railway carriages for 
white and colored races” based on the “separate but equal” doctrine); JO ANN GIBSON ROBINSON, THE 
MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT AND THE WOMEN WHO STARTED IT: THE MEMOIR OF JO ANN GIBSON 
ROBINSON 43-44 (1987) (documenting how Rosa Parks’ criminal arrest for refusing to surrender her seat 
to a white man led to the successful Montgomery bus boycott and the striking down of Alabama’s bus
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The nexus between civil rights law and criminal defense work is a 
second explanation for the black lawyer’s interest in criminal law; it is not 
that African-Americans are somehow more altruistic when it comes to 
careers upholding the cause of criminal justice or other civil rights related 
causes.  Just as African-American lawyers played a crucial role in the 
advancement of civil rights, the civil rights movement was crucial to the 
success and advancement of African-American lawyers.  84
Today’s African-American attorneys continue to recognize the roles 
that civil rights and inequality play in their own lives and those of close 
friends and family.  They view the protection of the rights of the 
underprivileged as being in their self-interest.85  In addition to the self-
interest motive that many minority criminal defense attorneys experience, a 
number of minority attorneys believe that they have a duty to “give 
something back” to their communities. One prominent scholar has named 
this the “obligation thesis.”86  Consistent with his “obligation thesis”, many 
of the minority attorneys interviewed described a sense of kinship with their 
minority clients.  At least one specifically described his cause as improving 
the condition of African-Americans.87  It is not to say that these African-
segregation laws); see also Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 983, 985-86, 1015 (2004) (arguing that the hip hop nation – which the author describes as 
a transformative and multicultural socio-political movement among white, black, Asian and Latino 
youth – perceives that criminal laws are at times used as an instrument of racial subordination).
84. Porter, supra note 82, at 157-58.  As Porter notes with the example of Charles Hamilton 
Houston, the chief engineer behind the legal strategy of the civil rights movement:
African American participation in the economic and political life of the country was in the 
best interest of Houston, his lawyers, and the black community in general. . . .. It was in 
[Houston’s] interest to have a personal commitment toward the idea of fairness in equality 
of opportunity, although all educated black masses would benefit from such equality.
Id.
85. I do not mean to suggest that defense work has a monopoly on these goals when it comes to 
criminal law.  As an interesting aside, African-Americans are increasingly joining the ranks of 
prosecutors.  This phenomenon is not inconsistent with the recognition that issues of racial inequity and 
discrimination will continue to be fought on the terrain of criminal law.  Some African-Americans may 
choose to prosecute because “[p]rosecutors, more than any other officials in the system, have the power, 
discretion, and responsibility to remedy the discriminatory treatment of African Americans in the 
criminal justice process.”  Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of 
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 17-18 (1998) (arguing that prosecutors have tremendous power 
and discretion to cause or remedy discrimination against African-Americans as defendants and victims 
of crime); cf. Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African-Americans Prosecute 
Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1505 (2000) (questioning whether individual African-American 
prosecutors can be agents of social change in the black community given political and professional 
pressures on the prosecutor’s role).
86. David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the 
Values of Black Corporate Lawyers,  45 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1983- 84 (1993). Specifically speaking of 
corporate lawyers, the obligation thesis holds that successful blacks have moral obligations to help the 
black community that must be balanced against other professional and personal commitments when 
making particular decisions and when constructing a moral life plan.  Id.
87. Transcript of A14, supra note 71, at 3-4 (“I was involved in the Black Student Movement in 
the 60’s.  President of the Black Student Union, Vice-President of Production, President in high school, 
Vice-President at the University of Nebraska, um, so I came out, when I, went to law school, I went to 
13984-TEXT.NATIVE.1111093852 3/18/2005 2:33 PM
2005] CRIMINAL DEFENDERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS 27
American lawyers felt less of a professional obligation toward their non-
minority clients but rather that their motivation to engage in the work in the 
first place was brought on by the personal obligation they felt toward 
members of their minority communities.
d. Gender
Contrary to the roles that race and ethnicity play as a motivating factor 
in cause lawyering, none of the respondents claimed that gender played a 
role in motivating attorneys to choose criminal defense work.  Not one of 
the women attorneys interviewed provided a gendered justification for her 
choice of work.  As the “gender-based motive” argument goes, women 
engage in an ethic of care that leads them to empathize with oppressed or 
subordinated people.88  As lawyers, their feminine side leads them to 
choose careers in which they can play out the caring or nurturing instincts 
that prioritize relationship-centered approaches over rights-centered 
approaches.89 One explanation for this absence might be that the gender-
based stereotype (even if true) cuts both ways when it comes to criminal 
law.  Both defendants and crime victims can be viewed empathetically and 
are logical beneficiaries of an ethic of care.At least one scholar lamented 
the fact that criminal defendants were too often indistinguishable from their 
victims as a group.90  It is possible that women might be more likely to 
identify with crime victims than with the alleged perpetrators of crimes 
(especially in sex crimes, domestic violence and property crimes where 
women are particularly vulnerable).  Of course, this is mere conjecture 
because this study did not explore this precise question with respondents.
law school with a mission.  And, that mission was to in some way alleviate the conditions of the 
African-American people.  I mean, that’s what I went there for.  And, and, and I, and I kind of swore 
once I took the bar exam that I would never betray that.”).
88. See e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and 
Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 75, 76-77 & nn.8-9 (1994) (“Opposed to male moral reasoning 
was the female ‘ethic of care,’ based on the structure of the ‘web.’ This female ethic was grounded in a 
relational, connected, contextual form of reasoning that focused on people, as well as the substance of a 
problem.”).
89. Transcript of A19, supra note 79, at 12 (“ I started doing this kind of work because I wanted to 
help people and that was my whole goal.  I never wanted to be any other kind of lawyer other than a 
criminal defense lawyer and I always did it because I wanted to help people.”); Transcript of Interview 
with Attorney A3 at 3 (Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A3] (referring to the role of the defense 
attorney  that of both a shepherd and a social worker and concludes that it is consistent with her goals to 
be that sort of “support person.”).
90. Harvard Law Professor and criminal defense attorney Charles Ogletree described his growing 
discomfort in the role of defender  when he began to realize how much victims and defendants—both 
often poor and black—resembled one another.  “When victims become indistinguishable from clients, I 
become very introspective about what I am doing in the process, very self-critical about the role lawyers 
play.”  SARA LAWRENCE-LIGHTFOOT, I’VE KNOWN RIVERS: LIVES OF LOSS AND LIBERATION 130 
(1994).
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6. Colleagues and the Defense Bar as Motivators
The vast majority of the attorneys in the study had not practiced in any 
other legal field but criminal defense.  Nor did they want to.  When asked if 
she had ever considered prosecuting cases, one lawyer emphatically 
answered “Never!”91  Another lawyer stated that she would leave the 
practice of law altogether if she ever quit being a defense attorney.92  These 
answers were somewhat surprising given how difficult criminal defense 
work can be.  Many cause lawyers enter their fields completely devoted to 
their causes but then experience “burn out” after a few years.  The lawyers 
interviewed for this study went on to explain that they were continually 
motivated by their friends and compatriots in the criminal defense bar.93
Although they too experienced fatigue and burn out, they were rejuvenated 
by attending criminal defense conferences, exchanging ideas with other 
defense lawyers, and even watching each other in court or hearing of one 
another’s victories.94  As one lawyer put it, “[W]e see each other in court.  
We read each other’s motions and we. . .it gives us that hope. . .it provides 
us that impetus to be zealous. . .to be the best advocates we can be.”95
Many lawyers were proud to be members of what they viewed as an 
exclusive group of attorneys.  It was important to them that they retained 
the respect of their colleagues96 and were not perceived as incompetent, 
lazy, or worse yet, as “sell-outs.”97 Many lawyers repeatedly explained that 
91. Questionnaire from Interview with Attorney 10 (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Questionnaire 
from A10]; see supra Fig. 3; see also Transcript of A39, supra note 69, at 13 (“I could never be a 
prosecutor.”); Transcript of A19, supra note 79, at 12 (“I never wanted to be any other kind of lawyer 
other than a criminal defense lawyer.”).
92. Transcript of A34, supra note 38, at 7 (“I cannot imagine not doing this . . . and I don’t mean 
just that I can’t imagine retiring . . . . I cannot imagine going a week or two weeks without, like really 
caring, not just having to care, but really caring about what happens to these people.”).
93. Transcript of A40, supra note 62, at 16 (“The people in the office, and I would say it’s the 
defense bar influences us greatly.”).
94. Transcript of A34, supra note 38, at 8 (“I think every . . . it’s so interesting going to court or 
co-counseling with other attorneys, especially in this office, we all have such different styles, and 
sometimes you know, you reach past the client or the prosecutor, just bringing in somebody else who’s 
so different than you is really what you need, but we’re all so different that I take a little bit away from 
everyone that I work with, and learn a little bit from each and every person in this office.”).
95. See Transcript of A31, supra note 50, at 19.
96. See Transcript of A9, supra note 59, at 12 (explaining that “it has been ingrained in me from 
my colleagues that you just don’t want to screw your clients that way.”).
97. Many of the lawyers interviewed spoke often in disparaging terms about lawyers that were 
widely considered “bad lawyers” by their peers.  The desire not to be so categorized by peers was one 
factor, among others, that motivated some attorneys to do a good job.  See, e.g., Transcript of A39, 
supra note 69, at 5 (“I don’t think that anything that the client does really changes the performance of 
that lawyer.  Either they’re lazy and do a bad job or incompetent and do a bad job. . . .”); Transcript of 
A37, supra note 48, at 28 (“[Y]ou know there are attorneys who are lazy and this is regardless of the 
guidelines, you know, want to plead out all their cases, you know, take a retainer fee, plead out their 
case and . . . go fishing.”); Transcript of Interview with Attorney 8 at 19 (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter 
Transcript of A8] (“[S]o it looks like the retained counsel is filing that motion in court a lot and fighting 
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their colleagues—whether through positive or negative reinforcement—
were one of the primary influences over what kind of advocates they were.
7. Material and Miscellaneous Motives
Not all the motives discussed by the attorneys were related to cause 
lawyering.  In addition to those discussed above, many of the lawyers 
mentioned motives for choosing their work that had little to do with the 
common themes of cause lawyering.  There were both positive and negative 
motivators.  They talked about the compensation, the autonomy of having 
to answer to no one but the client, the improved hours over large law firms, 
and the early litigation experience available in criminal work.  Others 
discussed feeling initially excluded from top government or law firm jobs 
for reasons ranging from being minorities to mediocre grades in law school.  
Although no one said this explicitly, a few of the attorneys seemed to 
remain in their fields out of inertia.  For instance, one lawyer who had been 
defending criminal cases for over twenty years explained he was just a few 
years from retirement and didn’t want to change careers despite being “very 
tired of it all.” Although these motives have little to do with cause 
lawyering, they are important to mention insofar as it should be 
acknowledged the presence of other motives does not necessarily negate 
cause lawyering.  That is, it may be possible for a cause lawyer to be 
motivated by a mix of traditional “causes” and also be attracted to the work 
for reasons unrelated to a cause.
II. CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AS CAUSE LAWYERS: THEORETICAL 
SUPPORT
While Part I of the paper is empirical, Part II is grounded in theory—
applying the existing literature on cause lawyering to the enterprise of 
criminal defending.  The purpose here is to define the theoretical conception 
of cause lawyering to determine whether and where criminal defenders fit.  
The study of cause lawyering contributes to our understanding of social 
movements and legal reform.  Likewise, an appreciation of criminal defense 
lawyers as cause lawyers can reveal scores about the nature and progress of 
criminal law reform.
As part of the study of socio-legal change, scholars have long been 
trying to define cause lawyering: recognize its forms and understand its 
motivations.  They have done so largely by attempting to determine the 
boundaries of cause lawyering—that is, determining what it is by 
for them and all, that is like salesmanship in some ways . . . . The retained counsel would file things just 
to make the impression to the client.”).
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distinguishing what it is not.98  Must these lawyers serve traditional liberal 
causes or can they serve conservative ideals?99 Can they represent 
individuals or groups and classes of people?100 Can they be employed by 
the government, large firms, or individuals?101  Can they be paid 
handsomely for their work or must the work be remuneratively altruistic?102
Can their opponents also be cause lawyers?  Is traditional litigation required 
or can they be activists, demonstrators and lobbyists?  Must they be full-
time public interest lawyers or can private attorneys doing pro-bono work 
be included as cause lawyers?103
In the conventional literature on cause lawyering, the paradigmatic 
cause lawyer is a poorly-paid altruistic attorney who handles impact 
litigation cases on broad constitutional or moral issues.  The often touted 
examples of cause lawyers are human rights lawyers, civil rights and civil 
liberties lawyers, environmental lawyers, and anti-abortion lawyers.104
Criminal defense attorneys, whose cause is often the individual freedom of 
a particular defendant (without regard to guilt or innocence), are often 
omitted from the studies of cause lawyering.105  The exclusion of traditional 
criminal defense lawyers is in some respects understandable.  Criminal 
defense attorneys are often uncharitably depicted as using legal 
“technicalities” to represent individual defendants despite who these 
defendants are and what they have done rather than because of it.  While 
what they do in some ways resembles public interest work, the similarities 
extend principally to the high case-loads, impoverished clients, squalid 
work places, and low salaries that have become emblematic of the condition 
of the government lawyer.
98. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 33.
99. See, e.g., John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and Social 
Distance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5, 7 (2003) (“Some of the lawyers serving conservative causes are 
motivated by ideological commitment . . . Lawyers for religious, patriotic, and libertarian groups are, 
perhaps, more likely than business lawyers to be driven primarily by ideals rather than by financial gain 
or professional advancement.”).
100. See Sarat, supra note 4, at 333 (explaining that for some death penalty attorneys, successful 
cause lawyering is expressed in the important and intense relationships formed with individual clients); 
Sterett, supra note 11, at 307 (discussing the radical lawyer’s focus on individual clients rather than on 
the cause in Britain).
101. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1281 (1976) (articulating changing nature of litigation toward broad social reform cases, often involving 
government, rather than litigation between private parties).
102. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
103. Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social Justice and the 
Structures of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 4, at 201 (arguing for a reconsideration of the assumed separation 
between socially conscious lawyering and private practice).
104. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 5.
105. The exception to this is the anti-death penalty attorney.  See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 4.
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If in fact criminal defense attorneys are cause lawyers, they are an 
interesting case precisely because they defy the conventional stereotypes of 
cause or public interest lawyers.  It is feasible that no case need be made for 
classifying criminal defense lawyers as cause lawyers.  Much of the recent 
scholarship on cause lawyering has focused on questioning the perceived 
boundaries between conventional and cause lawyers.  Prominent 
contributors to the field tell us that cause lawyers can be private as well as 
public,106 can represent class actions and impact cases as well as individual 
clients,107 can be poorly-compensated or well-paid, can be altruistic or 
harbor ulterior motives.108
Criminal defense attorneys themselves encompass a diverse group, 
clouding certain classifications.  They bridge the divide between public 
interest and private practice, between government attorneys and anti-
establishment lawyers, between poorly paid and well-compensated 
professionals, between impact litigation lawyers and advocates for 
individuals.  This further makes the branding of defense attorneys as cause 
lawyers more difficult.
Nevertheless, the interviews with lawyers suggest that many criminal 
defense attorneys perceive themselves to be cause lawyers motivated by 
moral, political and ideological convictions.  While this self-perception is 
instructive in categorizing defense attorneys as cause lawyers, it cannot be 
dispositive.  The fact that criminal defense lawyers defy an easy 
categorization as cause lawyers helps illustrate that cause lawyering is a 
“contested concept”109  with room for divergent attorney practices and 
experiences.  The literature on cause lawyering and on the taxonomy of 
cause lawyers emphasizes that cause lawyering can take on a wide variety 
of forms.
Although scholars recognize the breadth of forms that cause lawyering 
can take, it is not so fluid as to become meaningless.  There is some 
agreement about a general definition.  The term cause lawyer describes the 
activist lawyer who is committed to using the law as a vehicle for building a 
“good” society.110  Because cause lawyers— also referred to as social 
justice lawyers— seek social change, they defy the common view of 
lawyering as a purely instrumentalist endeavor in which legal professionals 
106. Anna Marshall & Scott Barclay, Supporting a Cause, Developing a Movement, and 
Consolidating a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation in Vermont, in THE 
WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE (Stuart Scheingold & Austin Sarat eds., 2005).
107. Sterett, supra note 11, at 239-316.
108. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
109. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 5.
110. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional 
Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, 
supra note 4, at 410.
13984-TEXT.NATIVE.1111093852 3/18/2005 2:33 PM
32 ETIENNE
are hired to secure whatever goal the client desires.111For these activist 
lawyers, the client’s goal may reflect the greater cause but it is not 
necessarily an end in itself.  
The stereotypical cause lawyer has strong moral convictions that she 
seeks to effectuate through her work.  Her work is most commonly 
litigation or client representation.  Her work is part of a social movement in 
pursuit of an ideal or the protection of a group.  She is often a dissident and 
an opponent of authoritative figures and institutions.  When the cause 
lawyer represents individual people or takes on specific cases, they are 
generally in pursuit of furtherance of incremental changes that are part of a 
greater strategy.  She gets paid little for hard and unpopular work that can 
bear significant social, professional and status costs. The stereotypes have 
been increasingly questioned, if not debunked, in cause lawyering studies.
Criminal defense lawyers, for example, problemmetize any attempts to 
simplify the conception of the cause lawyer as they are not a monolithic 
group.  Some defense lawyers often have strong ideological and political 
beliefs that they seek to effectuate through their work, but others have 
chosen the profession because they enjoy the fight itself.  They represent 
individuals, but over time tend to think of these individuals as a class.  This 
is especially true for public defenders who represent so many individuals 
serially that their corpus of clients resembles a group.112  Moreover, some 
define their work not by whom they represent but by whom they oppose.  
Their purpose is to challenge law enforcement and the government.  
Criminal defense lawyers do not necessarily fit the stereotype of public 
interest lawyers who are poorly compensated.  These lawyers are 
simultaneously some of the worst and best compensated attorneys in the 
profession.  In addition, the work settings for criminal defending run the 
gamut from the public defender’s office to some of the nation’s most 
prestigious law firms.  Their clients can be drug dealers, traffic violators, 
tax evaders, white collar executives, the mafia or institutions.  Although the 
public defenders and appointed attorneys are not government employees in 
the traditional sense, they are typically paid by a governmental entity.  
Finally, criminal defense lawyers are critical players in the criminal justice 
system.  The system could not, constitutionally, function without them.  
Thus these cause lawyers are in the odd situation of legitimizing the very 
system and laws they seek to challenge.
111. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 12, at 3.
112. I am reminded of a federal trial I once witnessed where the prosecutor, in his final opportunity 
to sway the jury, began his closing argument with the trembling words “Ladies and Gentlemen of the 
jury, I represent the people of the United States of America.”  Not to be bested, when it was his turn to 
address the jury, the defense attorney began:  “Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I too represent people 
of the United States of America.  I just do it one person at a time.”
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Despite some of these anomalies in the criminal defense enterprise, 
there can be little doubt that they are cause lawyers.  Admittedly my 
research shows that not every criminal defense attorney interviewed is 
motivated solely or even predominantly by “the cause.”113  Nonetheless that 
does not disqualify criminal defending as a profession that is generally 
occupied by cause lawyers.  As Marshall and Barclay explain, many 
lawyers who would accurately be categorized as cause lawyers are 
frequently excluded by scholars because they do not fit squarely into the 
cause lawyering framework.114  Lawyers who work in firms, are 
handsomely paid, handle cases outside of their “causes,”  or do not even 
identify themselves with a cause may nonetheless be cause lawyers. 
Marshall and Barclay caution that scholars of cause lawyering do best to 
emphasize the “cause” over the “lawyer” because focusing on the lawyer’s 
habits, practice or demographics leads to an overly rigid and under-
inclusive approach.  A cause-centered approach ultimately provides a more 
nuanced view of social movements and those involved in them.  115
III. MANAGING CONFLICTS
Having established that many criminal defense lawyers are cause 
lawyers, the question arises:  What difference does this make?  Do criminal 
defense lawyers qua cause lawyers handle their cases differently?  Are their 
clients better off or worse off? I argue that lawyers who are guided by their 
own moral and political values – in addition to the ethical and professional 
rules—are better lawyers for criminal defendants.  For them, the baseline of 
what constitutes successful advocacy is generally  higher.  In addition, the 
stakes of advocacy are greater for lawyers who are concerned about both 
the client and the cause.  It stands to reason however that the greatest 
danger arises when there is a potential conflict between the cause pursued 
by the lawyer and either the interests of the client or the norms of the 
profession.  In other words, if we are to evaluate the merits of criminal 
cause lawyers,  a critical part of that evaluation must turn on how they 
manage conflicts.
One very distinct feature of cause lawyering is the nature of the ethical 
and professional conflicts encountered and how they are resolved.  For all 
cause lawyers there exists, at least theoretically, a tension between serving 
the individual client and serving the social cause.  Under the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
113. See infra Part I.B.7.
114. Marshall & Barclay, supra note 106.
115. Id.
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attorneys must, first and foremost, represent the interests of their clients.116
And they must do so zealously.117  These guidelines say nothing of the 
lawyer’s own cause.  The cause lawyer hopes that her cause and the client’s 
interests will be compatible, if not identical.  However, the potential for 
conflict may be heightened for the criminal defense attorney who must use 
all legal means at her disposal to help defend her client regardless of her 
own feelings about the client’s innocence and whether the client’s release is 
in society’s best interest.
At first blush there appears to be little room in the criminal defense 
enterprise for any cause other than the defendant’s freedom.  But the 
lawyers interviewed during the course of the qualitative study described 
above found interesting ways to handle the conflicts that arise in their work.  
Some of these situations were not perceived as conflicts by the lawyers but 
seem, from the outsider’s perspective, to involve very real potential for 
conflict.  In this section, I consider three examples of the types of 
“conflicts” commonly faced by the attorney respondents in the study.
First, I examine the criminal cause lawyer’s desire to allow each 
defendant a day in court regardless of the merits of the defendant’s 
argument.  One example of this dilemma occurs when attorneys refuse to 
file Anders briefs.  The refusal to file such briefs conflicts with the 
attorney’s duty, as an officer of the court, to refrain from filing frivolous 
motions.  A second conflict involves the cause lawyer’s temptation to use 
collective action to improve the condition of criminal defendants as a group 
even when it poses risks to individual defendants.  The two examples of 
collective action presented by the respondent attorneys were used to combat 
prosecutorial or government policies.  In one instance, some lawyers 
described the prosecutorial policy of requiring defendants to waive 
appellate rights in plea agreements, and in another instance the execution of 
Miranda warnings for bilingual defendants.  The third conflict entails the 
triage engaged in by criminal cause lawyers who attempt to be selective in 
determining which claims to make for which clients.  They do with an eye 
of reserving certain issues for test cases or foregoing certain claims to 
reserve credibility for future cases.  The situations described by the defense 
lawyers involved conflicts between the court and professional rules and 
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) (“A lawyer must . . . act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client . . . .”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980) (“A lawyer shall not intentionally . . . [f]ail to seek the lawful 
objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary 
Rules.”).
117. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt 1 (2003) (“A lawyer must also act . . . with 
zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) 
(“The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously 
within the bounds of the law.”).
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their visions of their roles as cause lawyers, conflicts between client’s 
immediate interests and the cause, and between present clients and future 
clients.  I contend later that all of these practices are to some degree 
endemic to cause lawyering but they present conflicts of interest and would 
be prohibited by a strict reading of the professional responsibility rules.
A. The Anders  Brief: Navigating the Duties to the Court Versus the Client
Criminal defense lawyers who are cause lawyers oftentimes face 
ethical conflicts between their perceived duties to the profession as officers 
of the court and their perceived duties to their clients.118  This sort of 
conflict is not unique to cause lawyers119 but may take different forms in the 
cause lawyer context.  One particular variation of this conflict for criminal 
defense lawyers who are cause lawyers arises with the filing of Anders
briefs on appeal.
An indigent criminal defendant has the constitutional right to the 
assistance of appointed counsel that generally extends to the first appeal.120
In some instances, attorneys are appointed in cases in which no meritorious 
appellate issues exist.  A court appointed attorney saddled with an appeal 
that appears to lack grounds faces the choice of either filing a frivolous 
appeal or informing the court (almost certainly against the client’s wishes) 
that there are no worthwhile claims to present.  The vehicle by which an 
attorney could communicate the lack of meritorious issues and her 
subsequent desire to withdraw is called an Anders brief— named for a 1967 
Supreme Court case.121  The Anders brief allows the attorney a 
constitutional yet graceful retreat from an appeal she perceives to be 
frivolous.122  By submitting an Anders brief, an attorney can circumvent the 
conflict between protecting the defendant’s constitutional rights to access to 
the appellate process123 and the lawyer’s ethical responsibility to pursue 
118. See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants 
Pay for the Sins of their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2115-17 (2003) (describing conflicts arising 
between a lawyer’s obligations to the legal system and her obligations to the client).
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. § 9 (“In the nature of law practice, however, 
conflicting responsibilities are encountered.  Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict 
between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in 
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.”).
120. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
121. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
122. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so 
that is not frivolous. . . .”); David Mote, Appealing Issues, THE BACK BENCHER, Jan. 1998, available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/benchv10.htm (“Fed. R. App. P. 38 . . . require[s] that all appeals and 
arguments be well grounded and provide[s] for sanctions for making frivolous arguments or filing 
frivolous appeals.”).
123. Anders, 386 U.S. at 745 (“This procedure will assure penniless defendants the same rights and 
opportunities on appeal . . . as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but who are 
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only claims of merit.124  The key to preserving constitutionality125 is that the 
attor ney remain an “active advocate on behalf of [her] client,” even if she 
finds the appeal lacking merit.126
The safeguards in place under Anders to insure “active advocacy” are 
quite strenuous.127 Judges require that the Anders brief meet the strict 
requirements laid out in Anders v. California.128 Nonetheless for most 
criminal defense lawyers who are committed to the cause of helping their 
needy and often disadvantaged clients,129 the filing of an Anders brief 
against the client’s wishes and interests is perceived as a betrayal.  Not 
surprisingly, many of the attorneys I interviewed  avoided writing Anders
briefs in any circumstances.  They devised clever ways to justify their 
decisions not to file Anders briefs or to avoid the conflict altogether.
Of the defense attorneys interviewed, only five had ever filed an 
Anders brief.130  Each of the interviewed attorneys that had filed an Anders 
able to afford the retention of private counsel.”); see also Mary R. True, The Constitutional Basis of the 
Indigent Appellant’s Right to Appointed Counsel: Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346 (1988), 58 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1137, 1149 (1990).
While the Anders Court primarily based their decision on the necessity of protecting the 
defendants’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, subsequent caselaw has added to the 
analysis the attorney’s ethical duty to withdraw in the event that the appeal sought is frivolous.  See
McCoy v. Court of Appeals Of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1988) (“Although a defense attorney 
has a duty to advance all colorable claims and defenses, the canons of professional ethics impose limits 
on permissible advocacy.”).
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003).
125. Cases after Anders also discuss, in more detail than Anders, the constitutional concerns 
implicated by the defendant’s due process rights and right to counsel.  See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 
(1988) (finding that the Ohio Court of Appeals failed a defendant in first granting appellate counsel’s 
motion to withdraw, and then failing to appoint new counsel); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) 
(asserting that Anders recognized a due process right as well, by requiring effective assistance of counsel 
during a defendant’s first appeal).
126. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”).
127. The attorney must first perform a “conscientious examination” of the case.  Anders, 386 U.S. at 
744.  If she then finds the appeal to be “wholly frivolous,” she must notify the court and request the 
court’s consent to withdraw.  Id.  Next, she must file a brief discussing any potential appellate issues and 
also allow her client to review the brief, giving the client time to raise further points if desired.  Id.  The 
burden then falls on the court to review the brief and decide whether or not the appeal is truly frivolous.  
Id.
128. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Andrea Lynn Evensen, Ethics Extra:  Removing Illinois Attorneys 
From Between the Ethical Rock and a Hard Place:  Illinois Current Anders Requirements Should Be 
Reconsidered, 18 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 56, 56 (2004).
129. See infra Part I (B).
130. See Transcript of A40, supra note 62, at 13 (asserting that Anders briefs in her office are rare, 
because of the limited appellate work they do; also stating that she avoids writing an Anders brief by 
withdrawing at District Court level); Transcript of A37, supra note 48, at 23 (“[T]he one time I did an 
Anders Brief . . . I truly felt ethically anything else would of been frivolous; on the other hand if I can 
find a borderline frivolous issue, then I’ll bring through on Anders.”); Transcript of A36, supra note 37, 
at 17 (“[T]here just was no . . . question there was no argument that could be made . . . so and I didn’t 
have a choice but to file it.”); Transcript of A32, supra note 41, at 14; Transcript of Interview with 
Attorney 7 at 12 (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A7].
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brief in the past had done so only once131 and seemed to do have done so 
with great reluctance.  One of the few attorneys who had written an Anders
brief in the past explained, “I hated having to argue against my client.”132
When another was asked why she had filed only one in her career, she 
responded, “I just feel like if you have some sort of an argument go ahead 
and make it to the client that is all. I guess it is sort of ideological.”133
The attorneys who had not filed Anders briefs gave various 
explanations for avoiding them.  Of particular concern to many of the 
interviewees was a belief in the client’s right to appeal, and the attorney’s 
duty to zealously advocate for the client.134  Many attorneys feel as if the 
Anders brief is a sign of disloyalty to the client.  As one lawyer explained:
[T]o me an Anders Brief is almost like a slap in the face to the client. 
Why are you even bothering to write the brief, if all you are going to say 
is here is all the reasons to deny relief.  To me it is sort of inherently 
conflicts with your obligation to represent the client zealously. . . . To 
me it is just contrary to every instinct I have as the defense lawyer to get 
up in public, a public document, say my client is a loser, or his issues are 
loser issues.135
According to another attorney, filing an Anders brief is tantamount to 
surrendering or waving  a “white flag” on the client’s behalf.136  Perhaps for 
this reason, there seems to be a stigma attached to any attorney filing and 
Anders brief.  Some attorneys noted that their colleagues actively or 
covertly discouraged the action.137  Others consider fellow lawyers that file 
Anders briefs as “lazy.”138
Because attorneys do not like to file Anders briefs, they find all sorts 
of justifications for  avoiding them.  Most attorneys faced with a conflict 
between their obligation to the client and their ethical obligation to avoid 
bringing frivolous cases largely opt in favor of the client.  One attorney, 
confronted with a “very weak, and terrible issue,” appealed 
anyway.139Another, considering the possibility, asserted that:
131. See Transcript of A40, supra note 62, at 13; Transcript of A37, supra note 48, at 23; Transcript 
of A36, supra note 37, at 17; Transcript of A32, supra note 41, at 14; Transcript of A7, supra note 130, 
at 12.
132. Transcript of A36, supra note 37.
133. Transcript of A7, supra note 130.
134. See Transcript of A23, supra note 42.
135. Transcript of A10, supra note 39.
136. Transcript of A7, supra note 130.
137. See, e.g., Transcript of A25, supra note 38, at 11; Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 17; 
Transcript of A8, supra note 97, at 17.
138. See, e.g., Transcript of A39, supra note 69; Transcript of A37, supra note 48; Transcript of  
A8, supra note 97; Transcript of A3, supra note 89.
139. Transcript of A39, supra note 69; Transcript of A37, supra note 48; Transcript of  A8, supra 
note 97; Transcript of A3, supra note 89.
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I would I would think that if . . . [I’m] in a position to do [an Anders 
brief], I’d rather write up an appeal in which I had an issue no matter 
how weak the issue was than write up an appeal in which I had to 
explain why every issue I considered is a failure.  I mean if you’re gonna 
have to write it, I’d just rather write something I was adversarial in and 
as acting as an advocate.140
Some attorneys viewed the Anders dilemma not as a formalistically 
ethical problem but rather as a moral problem.  One attorney was quite 
blunt: “I know it’s not an ethical problem. I think it’s immoral.  I don’t 
think any defense attorney should ever file one.”141  Other attorneys argued 
that not filing Anders briefs seemed more consistent with their ethical 
obligations as officers of the court than filing them.  They argued that filing 
the Anders brief was time consuming and a waste of resources for the 
court.142  Most lawyers explained that preparing an Anders brief often 
requires much more writing than an appeal itself.143  Anders briefs “take 
like 10 times the amount of time and energy that filing an actual appellate 
brief does,” said one attorney.144  In support of this belief, one interviewee 
described the typical Anders process:
Frankly, the Anders brief is more work than the other one, because [here 
is] . . . almost always what [our] Circuit does [when] you file an Anders
brief, which takes a lot of time because you have to argue why all these 
issues are not issues: [Our] circuit will look at it . . . and say, “Well, we 
disagree with you on this issue,” or they’ll issue an order saying, 
“Here’s an issue we think you should appeal that you didn’t discuss.”  
So . . .  you’ve filed the Anders brief, and then now you’ve got to brief 
this other issue, which the []Circuit says you should have—you feel kind 
of foolish then. You file [the issue identified by the court], you go up 
and argue it, and you’re in this sort of awkward position because you’re 
advocating a position that you first either didn’t think about or said you 
didn’t believe in. And then what usually happens almost always is that 
the []Circuit denies it anyways. So, raise this issues, and so you do all 
this work raising this issue, and then they say, “Well, no, you’re wrong.” 
So to me it’s easier, it’s just less time consuming, to find some sort of 
legal foothold to raise [the standard appeal].145
140. Transcript of  A33, supra note 40.
141. Transcript of A5, supra note 55, at 9.
142. For a contrary view, see James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way For the ABA:  
Smith v. Robbins Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 65, 103-06 (2001); 
Frederick D. Junkin, The Right to Counsel in “Frivolous” Criminal Appeals:  A Reevaluation of the 
Guarantees of Anders v. California, 67 TEX. L. REV. 181, 187 (1988).
143. See, e.g., Transcript of A23, supra note 42 (“But I think as a practical matter, it’s harder to do, 
it’s more work.”).
144. Transcript of A34, supra note 38.
145. Transcript of A23, supra note 42; see also Transcript of A10, supra note 39, at 15 (“In fact in 
this circuit in particular, which I think arguably keeps spreading, if you submit an Anders Brief our 
experience has been, they send it back to you and tell you to argue the issue, or they will give oral 
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Another strategy used by attorneys to avoid filing the Anders brief 
involves persuading the client to forego the appeal.  If the client can be 
made to agree to waive the right to appeal, this effectively nullifies the 
conflict between actively following the client’s wishes and responsible use 
of court resources.  Most lawyers thought that if one searched hard enough, 
there was almost always an appealable issue to be found. But as one lawyer 
said,  “if you reach that point, your client needs to understand why an 
appeal is not the right course of action.”146
Finally, some attorneys avoided the conflict altogether by adopting a 
very limited definition of frivolousness and often found merit in issues that 
had been squarely decided against them.147 They admitted that the meaning 
of frivolity seems to differ between defense attorneys and the judges and 
prosecutors.  Many of the defense attorneys think that the charge of 
frivolous is “overused” by judges and prosecutors.148  Their perspective is 
different by virtue of their roles.149  As one attorney put it, if defense 
lawyers did not file  claims that had only a small chance of winning, “we 
would never file anything at all.”150  Another attorney explained, 
“prosecutors and judges who are mostly former prosecutors tend to have a 
cynical view.” 151  Not all of the interviewees perceived judges as harshly 
narrow on the frivolity question.  While one noted that judges were often 
apt to find claims without precedent frivolous, she also added: “ I think . . . 
some judges have a greater appreciation of the need to make some 
arguments to satisfy the client’s needs. . . knowing that you are obliged to 
make some arguments that you may not even believe in.152  Still, most of 
argument on it. You know then they are very quick to criticize what they perceive to be frivolous 
appeals, but at the same time they seem not inclined to accept Anders Briefs.”).
146. Transcript of A23, supra note 42; Transcript of A10, supra note 39, at 15; see also Transcript 
of A12, supra note 68 (discussing the decision to file an appeal or an Anders brief and explaining that 
“part of that job is, I believe, getting your client to understand the course of action that is probably most 
prudent for them”); Transcript of A8, supra note 97 (“When there have been cases where there is no 
possible appeal issue, I discuss that with the clients, they generally ask for an appeal to be done. I 
haven’t had that situation come up. I think part of it . . . with a lot of the clients, is communicating with 
them sufficiently so they understand the situations.”).
147. Transcript of A10, supra note 39 (“You may have an issue that you think is a great issue, and 
you recognize the court’s authorities against you, but you want to preserve a case, a law changes down 
the road, or you want to make a rehearing or a certain petition. That is one way to acknowledge the 
weight of authority from saying this has no merit.”).
148. Transcript of A7, supra note 130.
149. Transcript of A12, supra note 68 (“I can feel how important every issue is to that client.  How 
it affects their freedom.  [And] I’m not in court as often as most prosecutors and as often as 
judges . . . .”).
150. Transcript of A11, supra note 39, at 4.
151. Transcript of A6, supra note 70 (“I have been doing defense work for nine years, and that 
necessarily means that I have different perspective than prosecutors do . . . . [F]or instance, they would
think it is frivolous for me to argue that the person who has dealt drugs on numerous occasions in the 
past, on this occasion was just in the wrong place at the wrong time. They would think that is frivolous. I 
think that is entirely possible . . . .”).
152. Transcript of A10, supra note 39.
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the attorneys interviewed seemed prepared to risk a charge of frivolity 
rather than submit an Anders brief, even understanding that such a charge 
could result in sanction.153
B. Collective Action in Furtherance of the Cause
Criminal defendants and their attorneys often feel outmatched by the 
strength and resources of the state to investigate and prosecute.154  The 
enormous power differential between the state and the defense consists of 
resource imbalances, procedural advantages,  and political and 
psychological advantages.155  These inequities lead to further imbalances in 
bargaining power156-—a critical element in the over ninety-six percent of 
cases that end in guilty pleas.157 The power imbalance is likely to be 
reinforced by legislators given the political pressures of the “tough on 
crime” climate.  Similarly, the Supreme Court is not likely to intercede as it 
was held long ago that there is no requirement that defendants be placed on 
the same footing as the Government.158
One way in which defense attorneys have attempted to address the 
power differential is by subscribing to the old adage that there is power in 
numbers.  Collective action is a promising idea for criminal defendants 
who, if acting together, could work to seriously handicap the criminal 
justice process.  The potential of the collective action strategy is obvious if 
one imagines what would happen if all criminal defendants exercised their 
rights to a trial by jury.  The criminal justice system would probably 
collapse under the tremendous backlog of cases such a strategy would 
generate.159  Most governments simply do not allocate enough resources—
prosecutors, judges, jurors or even courtrooms—to handle a large trial 
153. See Transcript of A24, supra note 43; Transcript of A3, supra note 89 (“Well you can get fined 
if you raise trouble with arguments. . . . Not only have they been fined but they’ve been disbarred.  So 
that’s a big problem.”).  But see Transcript of A39, supra note 69 (“[T]here’s no harm in filing a 
frivolous brief.  I mean, what are they going to do?  ‘This is frivolous!  We’re going to . . . .’  No.  
They’re just going to say, ‘This is frivolous – appeals denied.’  And at least the client has had a shot 
at . . . venting some . . . he feels that he’s at least had a shot at the process . . . .”).
154. Luban, supra note 65, at 1731-44.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1744-48.
157. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS—2000, 426, tbl. 5.16 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001).
158. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (clarifying that the relevant inquiry was not whether 
defense resources approximated prosecutorial resources but whether the defendant had access to “the 
basic tools” of an effective defense).  See also Peter Arenella, A Forward: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1233, 1234-35 (1996) (describing the resource imbalance problem between defense and 
prosecution and demonstrating the problem in reverse in the O.J. Simpson case); David Harris, The 
Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 482 (1992);
159. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:  Alternatives to 
the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983).
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caseload.  Arguably if a such a strategy could be implemented, defendants 
would be better off as a group.  Perhaps prosecutors would have to dismiss 
more cases, provide more enticing plea bargains, or do a less thorough job 
on each case tried.
So why don’t criminal defendants and their lawyers act collectively to 
seek jury trials in all cases?  Most defendants enter into plea agreements 
because they believe that they would be convicted at trial and risk harsher 
penalties.  If defendants collectively demanded trials, many would likely 
enjoy some benefit.  However, the first to be tried would pay the cost for 
this benefit by receiving higher sentences post-trial than they could have 
negotiated pre-trial.  The criminal justice system is designed to take 
advantage of the self-interested focus of most defendants.
Lawyers scrupulously observing their ethical duty to zealously 
represent each client would never advise a client to join this sort of 
collective action unless the client would clearly be one of the beneficiaries.  
Cause lawyers might have a different view. For the criminal defense cause 
lawyer who may see the class of criminal defendants generally as the 
beneficiary of her work, collective action has great allure.  It offers these 
lawyers an opportunity to help large numbers of people rather than one 
individual at a time.160  The defense lawyers with whom I spoke described 
two examples of how collective action was used to affect legal change in 
ways that went beyond benefits to their individual  clients.
1. Collective Opposition to Appeal Waivers
In September of 1995  the Department of Justice distributed a 
memorandum to federal prosecutors recommending that they consider 
including waivers of the right to appeal as a standard part of plea 
agreements in their districts.161  The Government worried that far too many 
government resources were being squandered on meritless appeals by 
160. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1111 (1990) (explaining that legal services lawyer face the dilemma of 
choosing between allegiance to individual clients and large groups of needy people).
161. The Department of Justice sent a memorandum to its prosecutors in September of 1995 
advising that appeal waivers were legal, and suggesting that prosecutors “evaluate whether waivers of 
sentencing appeal rights and post-conviction rights would be a useful addition to plea agreements in 
their districts.”  Catharine M. Goodwin, The Appeal Waiver Controversy Summary: 1996 Committee on 
Criminal Law Memo on Waivers of Appeal and Advisement of the Right To Appeal, 10 FED. SENT. R. 
212 (1998). Many of the attorneys corroborated their district’s attempts to institute appeal waiver 
policies in the mid-nineties. See Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 15 (explaining that the 
Government “didn’t used to ask for appeal waivers up until about 5 years ago, I’d say they started 
asking for appeal waivers . . . for every plea, they wanted appeal waivers”); Transcript of A11, supra
note 39, at 19 (discussing meeting with U.S. Attorneys in one district to discuss the Government’s 
policy of including appeal waivers in all plea agreements); id. at 20 (describing a conversation with one 
prosecutor who admitted to being evaluated on how often appeal waivers were successfully used).
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defendants who were merely unhappy with their sentences but had no good 
legal claims.162  On the other hand, defense attorneys worried that criminal 
defendants were being pressured to waive an important safeguard when 
faced with the threat of exorbitant guideline sentences.  As one lawyer 
explained, despite all attempts to prepare clients for what will happen at 
sentencing, defendants are put in a terrible position if “something 
unexpected comes up, . . . all of a sudden their sentence has jumped [up] by 
a third and they don’t have any appeal rights.”163  The bargaining away of 
the appeal right might negatively impact the individual defendant who 
would like to appeal a sentencing judge’s erroneous decision.164  At worst, 
the reduction of appeals on a mass scale could severely handicap the 
development of the law generally.  In the example provided by one 
attorney, he explained:
The law in [this] circuit may be well settled on a particular downward 
departure,  nevertheless if we don’t keep raising it the Court is never 
going to change their mind. I think [the waiver] does impact on the 
ability to excel at what we want to accomplish for advocating 
purposes.165
Another lawyer argued that with the rise in appeal waivers, not as 
many issues are being litigated and sometimes it becomes difficult to find 
cases on particular issues.166  To the extent that appellate courts play an 
important role in creating the common law of sentencing and regulating 
divergent applications of the law, their systematic exclusion from the 
criminal justice process is grounds for concern.
In response to these concerns, one strategy employed by some public 
defender offices and private criminal attorneys attempted to institute a “no 
waiver” policy.  The assumption was that if defendants refused plea 
162. Transcript of A8, supra note 97, at 10 (“That is why the government wants the waiver, in my 
mind, because they don’t want to do the work”); Transcript of Interview with Attorney 1 at 7-8 (Feb. 24, 
2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A1] (“I think that [appeal waivers are] a way for [prosecutors] to reduce 
their workload” because “they don’t want” to write appeals on what they see as frivolous issues.”).
163. Transcript of A1, supra note 162, at 7.
164. Transcript of A25, supra note 38, at 9 (“arguing that one problem with the waivers is that if 
“problems arise” at sentencing, “there’s really no avenue that’s available to [defendants].  Everything’s 
foreclosed.”); Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 5 (explaining that a waiver of appeal could impact a 
case if “your sentencing judge makes an incorrect legal decision— a decision that could be aptly 
incorrect based on the law in fact. . . . Yet there is an appeal waiver and in that sense it just almost 
totally eliminates the defense attorney’s ability to advocate. Even in the case of an incorrect application 
of law.”).
165. Transcript of A1, supra note 162, at 8.
166. Transcript of A5, supra note 55, at 18 (arguing that cases involving charges that carry higher 
sentences, such as gun charges, tend to be resolved with pleas carrying appeal waivers and so they tend 
to produce less sentencing case law than they might otherwise); see also Transcript of Interview with 
Attorney 13 at 17 (June 12, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A13] (“You know, there’s so many plea 
waivers and there’s so many pleas, that we’re not getting a true represented sampling in appeals about 
the great issues.  Um, people are just letting them you know, go down the old appeal waiver river.”).
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agreements containing waivers of the right to appeal, the United States 
Attorneys Office would eventually reverse its own policy  rather than suffer 
the huge backload of cases.  A systemic rejection of waivers would  only be 
successfully implemented if a sufficiently large number of defendants 
consistently took this position.  Because the decision regarding whether to 
accept a plea agreement is the defendant’s to make, a “no waiver” policy 
essentially means that attorneys would strongly discourage their clients to 
accept plea agreements that required a waiver of the right to appeal.  This 
technicality notwithstanding, most attorneys noted that they had a great deal 
of influence over their clients in such matters.167
The “no waiver” policy has its risks for the individual defendant and 
therefore should create a conflict for attorneys who recommend it only 
because of the benefit it creates to other defendants.  A defendant who 
rejects an attractive plea deal because it requires a waiver of appeal may 
end up with a higher sentence after going to trial or pleading with no 
agreement.  Taking this stance against appeal waivers is particularly 
questionable for the defendant who either has no good appeal issues or had 
no intention of appealing anyway.
Despite these risks, the lawyers interviewed described the strategies 
employed in their jurisdictions to address the appeal waivers.  Some 
lawyers explained the difficulty of trying to encourage a system-wide 
rejection of appeal waivers.  Attorneys often found that in individual cases, 
it was often in the defendant’s best interest to take a plea even if it included 
a waiver of appeal.  Although waivers of appeal were never beneficial to 
clients on their own, if they accompany some other benefit— such as the 
dismissal of a charge, the elimination of a mandatory minimum or 
consecutive sentencing provision—it would be difficult not to recommend 
that a client accept it.168
In one jurisdiction, the attorneys did not adopt a collective approach 
but rather treated the appeal waiver as an issue to be negotiated on a case by 
case basis.  The result of the negotiation depended on the leverage of the 
parties in that particular case and their commitment to including or 
excluding the waiver.169  But because the benefit of the collective approach 
167. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 4 at 7 (Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A4] 
(explaining that overall clients tend to take attorney’s advice to reject appeal waivers).  See also Ann 
Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decision-making in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study 
of Lawyers’ Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1105 (1996) (explaining that legal services attorneys 
had great influence over their clients).
168. Transcript of A8, supra note 97, at 10.
169. Transcript of A13, supra note 166, at 13 (“I have not been very effective in removing the 
waivers from pleas that I’ve negotiated.”); Transcript of A9, supra note 59, at 4 (“I know some 
prosecutors, if by force, they will just give up and leave the client without an appeal waiver. Some 
prosecutors won’t give up at all.”).
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is lost in a case by case determinations, many of the attorneys explained 
that they encouraged their clients to plead “straight” without plea 
agreements170 or they complained that they did not get much in exchange 
for waiving appellate rights.171
In another jurisdiction, the attorneys there were able to use their 
collective power to greatly reduce the use of appellate waivers across the 
board in the vast majority of cases.172  After the Government began its 
concerted effort to include appeal waivers in all plea agreements, a large 
number of lawyers in the district resisted them by encouraging their clients 
not to sign those plea agreements and to plead “blind” instead.173The 
waivers were included only in the few cases where the defendant received a 
significant benefit in return.  An example of such a benefit was the 
reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor.174 Interestingly the attorneys in this 
particular district believed they were more successful than attorneys in other 
districts at fighting the appeal waiver policy.
We don’t get a requirement of Appeal Waivers nearly as often as a lot of 
districts because from the beginning. . .well I guess a couple of reasons.  
We fought them hard from the beginning and they got tired of fighting 
us on this.  Now our US Attorney’s office backs down pretty quickly.  
We would say, “We’re not agreeing.”  And they would basically say, 
“Okay.”  It’s becoming a little bit harder now with this administration 
but we still get less Appeal Waivers than a lot of districts that I’ve heard 
of.  So it isn’t as major a problem as I think it is for other places.  The 
170. Transcript of A14, supra note 71, at 15 (“[In] many instances my advice to my clients, I let 
them make the decision, is let’s go in without a plea agreement.”); Transcript of A11, supra note 39, at 
11 (“That’s one of my best strategies.  I do this all the time.  I plead straight up.”).
171. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 16 at 21 (June 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A16] 
(“I’ve had a lot of cases where a prosecutor agrees and I’m not getting anything in the plea agreement 
that I couldn’t otherwise get by pleading to the indictment.”); Transcript of A10, supra note 39, at 12 
(“By and large, I haven’t gotten much for appeal waivers.”).
172. Transcript of A21, supra note 57, at 15 (describing being able to get appeal waivers removed 
from plea agreements in 90 percent of cases).
173. Attorneys used the term “blind plea” to refer to guilty pleas with no plea agreement.  Both 
parties would argue any sentencing issues to the judge and the judge would impose the sentence she 
thought was proper.  In such a case, both parties could appeal a sentence they believed to be erroneous.  
The blind plea became the primary means of resisting the appeal waiver.  See Transcript of A23, supra 
note 42, at 15 (“[F]or every plea, they wanted appeal waivers.  And the initial reaction was . . . and they 
wouldn’t back down, we just started doing blind pleas.”).  As another attorney in that district explained, 
the appeal waiver soon became an ineffective tool against experienced lawyers who became known 
among prosecutors for advising their clients against them.
[Waivers] don’t have any major effect.  Historically, first they didn’t exist.  Then the 
government tried to put them into lots of pleadings and then people like myself started 
doing blind pleas left and right.  Because if the government’s offer is worse than what I 
can do without a plea agreement why would I take your offer?  So the Government . . . 
they try to put in plea waivers . . . appeal waivers whenever they can. . . . But not, I think 
with somebody like me, if they’ve got a reputation that says “Don’t bother ‘cause he 
doesn’t . . . he doesn’t do these.”
Transcript of A22, supra note 68, at 11.
174. See Transcript of A21, supra note 57, at 15-16 (describing negotiation of a plea with an appeal 
waiver because a felony charge was reduced to a misdemeanor).
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cases ordinarily that they ask for an Appeal Waiver in are cases which 
they at least feel like they’ve given us a huge amount of stuff.175
Although the attorneys did not describe the response to appeal waivers 
as a collective action or coordinated policy, 176 every attorney I spoke to in 
that district dealt with appeal waivers in the same way.  The consequence 
was that the prosecutor’s office also developed a categorical rather than 
case-by case approach to the appeal waiver—demanding it in only cases 
where they believed defendants were enjoying a substantial benefit.177
2. Collective Action to Expand Miranda
The attorneys in one of the public defenders’ offices provided another 
interesting example of the use of collective action.  They explained that 
there was a sizeable and growing number of Spanish-speaking defendants 
in the district.178  Perhaps in response to the changing demographics, most 
federal law enforcement agencies were regularly providing the Miranda 
warnings to arrestees who did not speak English.  But the Latino defendants 
who spoke some English but were still more comfortable with Spanish were 
not being offered the Spanish-version Miranda warnings.  The defense 
lawyers were receiving complaints from these defendants who argued that 
they might have responded differently had they received the warnings in 
Spanish.
Unfortunately the law on this issue was not favorable to the defendants 
who have a functional command of the English.  The Miranda waiver must 
be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.179  Although the Government has 
the burden of proving the propriety of the waiver, the standard is quite 
broad.  A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals that it was “made with 
full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the 
consequences of the decision to abandon it”. 180  Under this totality of the 
circumstances test, it is unlikely that a court would exclude a statement 
made by someone marginally proficient in English simply because she 
175. Transcript of A28, supra note 49, at 7.
176. See Transcript of A21, supra note 57, at 15 (explaining that there was no office policy 
regarding appeal waivers).
177. Transcript of A39, supra note 69, at 6 (“I’m not just going to sign the plea agreement with that 
[waiver] paragraph in there unless you tell me something that you’re giving.  You know, like downward 
departure, agreeing to an out of the way departure.”); Transcript of A37, supra note 48, at 19 (stating 
“I’ve never, I’ve never waived an appeal that I didn’t want to waive, I’ve either gotten something major 
in return or haven’t waived it.”); Transcript of A28, supra note 49, at 7.
178. Indeed one of the largest growing demographics groups in federal prisons has been the Latino 
population.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 157.
179. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
180. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
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would have been more protected had the warnings been given in her native 
Spanish.181
Although these lawyers had very little hope of changing “the law on 
the books,” they devised a strategy to change “the law on the streets.”  The 
lawyers in both public defenders’ offices I visited had weekly meeting 
during which they discussed new cases, reported recent victories and 
strategies and shared concerns.182  In one such meeting, some of the lawyers 
discussed a plan to address the problem of Miranda warnings for Spanish-
speaking defendants.  The proposal required every attorney who had a case 
with Spanish-speaking or bilingual defendants to aggressively question the 
arresting officer on the stand (during preliminary hearings and suppression 
hearing) about her failure to read the Miranda rights in Spanish.  The idea 
was that over time, these officers would begin perceive the failure to 
provide the rights in Spanish as a weakness in the case that defendants 
could potentially exploit.  This tactic could be employed in most cases with 
Spanish-speakers, whether or not the defendant claimed she did not 
understand the warnings, whether or not there was a suppressible statement 
involved,  and whether or not the case was eventually likely to be resolved 
by plea.  The strategy was viewed as a harmless one even though the 
defendants in the cases in which it was used would not receive a benefit.
I attended an office meeting during which some of the lawyers were 
reporting on the success of this strategy.  According to the lawyers, it was 
remarkably successful, at least among some of the federal agencies.  One 
lawyer explained that it was now the unofficial policy of the U.S. Customs 
agents to read the Miranda warnings in Spanish for its many Spanish-
speaking arrestees.  Because many of the Customs officials spoke Spanish 
to the many Spanish-only speaking  detainees,  this was not difficult for the 
agents to adapt.  What was interesting was that even those Customs officers 
181. Several courts have found a perfunctory understanding of the Miranda warnings sufficient to 
support a knowing and intelligent waiver.  See United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 517 
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding that despite defendant’s claims to the contrary he understood enough English 
to render his Miranda waiver knowing and intelligent); United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1502 
(10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that despite imperfections of language translation, defendant understands 
the “essence” of Miranda warnings); United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 964-65 (D.C. Cir.1988)
(holding that errors in translated Miranda warning did not render warning constitutionally insufficient 
where defendant understood essence of rights); Perri v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448, 
452-53 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding Miranda warning administered in Italian by police officer with no 
formal training in Italian in dialect different from defendant’s sufficient to effectuate valid waiver); 
United States v. Boon San Chong, 829 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that waiver is proper if 
defendant understands that he does not need to speak to police and that any statement he makes may be 
used against him); United States v. Gonzales, 749 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.1984) (holding waiver valid 
where defendant appeared to understand Miranda warning administered by officer in broken Spanish).
182. I attended at least one of these meetings in both of the public defender offices I visited.  It was 
during one of these meetings that I first heard this particular strategy discussed.  For further descriptions 
of these meetings see Etienne, supra note 15, at 442-43.
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who did not speak Spanish were now carrying wallet-sized cards with a 
Spanish translation of the Miranda warnings.  The change among some of 
the larger agencies in the district, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations and the Drug Enforcement Agency,  was not as significant, 
but the lawyers noticed that some of those agents were also starting to 
testify during hearings to have read the Miranda rights in the language 
spoken by the defendant.
The attorneys happily reported that they had succeeded in changing the 
law by “training” the agents to provide Miranda warnings in Spanish.  What 
pleased them more is that they believed that they had made a small change 
in the minds of the prosecutors and judges as well.  The more some agents 
testified to providing the warnings in Spanish, the more it appeared that 
other agents were lacking if they did not do so.  The attorneys triumphantly 
recounted that it was not uncommon for the prosecutors to ask the federal 
agents on direct examination, before the defense had an opportunity to do 
so, if the Miranda warnings had been read in Spanish.  The prosecutor 
would then sit down gloatingly when the agent answered that she had.
What appeals to the cause lawyer about the use of collective action is 
its potential to harness the limited leverage of criminal defendants into a 
powerful bargaining entity.  However, the limitation of this strategy is that 
it puts the individual defendant at risk.  It is understandable why lawyers, 
including criminal defense lawyers, differ strongly in their views about the 
merits of collective action.  That said, understanding the attraction of 
collection action makes it easier to understand the actions of some attorneys 
which might otherwise appear arbitrary and unreasonable.
For example, this discussion of collective action brings us full circle to 
the Attorney Tarlow’s “policy” of not representing defendants who agree to 
assist law enforcement in cases against other suspects.  In light of the 
discussion on collective action, Tarlow’s policy may begin to look different 
to some.183  There is little doubt that the government relies heavily on 
snitches, informants and cooperating defendants to investigate and 
prosecute cases.  Although it is difficult to obtain figures regarding the 
number of cases that are founded on information provided through 
cooperation, it is safe to say that it is probably a significant percentage.  Of 
all federal sentences imposed, approximately 20% are reduced based on 
substantial assistance departures.184 Downward departures requested by the 
183. It is worth noting here that I have no knowledge as to whether Tarlow’s policy is part of some 
collective action strategy or an individual strategy.
184. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2000 COMMISSION - DATAFILE USSCFY00, tbl.29 (2000) 
(showing that 9,506 defendants out of 52,660 received downward departures for substantial assistance in 
2001); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1997-2001COMMISSIONN - DATAFILES USSCFY97-
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prosecutor, generally for substantial assistance, constitute over 80% of all 
downward departures.185  If all defendants stopped cooperating with 
authorities, this collective action would greatly hamper law enforcement 
efforts.  While this could be arguably disastrous for the general public in 
terms of crime reduction, criminal defendants might be better off as a whole 
if they collectively adopted Tarlow’s advice.
C. To Raise or Not to Raise an Issue?:  Managing Cases and Credibility
Perhaps one of the best known forms of cause lawyering involves the 
impact litigation model of lawyering.  Impact litigation lawyers  seek “to 
win cases to establish good precedent for future cases.”186  They select their 
clients carefully to pursue only those that are likely to advance the law in 
the direction they want it to go.187 Like many cause lawyers who engage in 
impact litigation,188 criminal defense attorneys oftentimes have particular 
issues or areas of the law in which they seek legal reform.  The problem 
faced by these lawyers, particularly the public defenders, is that unlike most 
impact litigation lawyers, they do not handpick their clients.189  In order to 
pursue impact litigation strategies, these lawyers tend to watch their dockets 
and wait for the right case to come along in which to raise a particular issue.  
This form of impact litigation can be fraught with  interesting conflicts.
Cause lawyers may not often have direct conflicts of interest between 
their clients’ goals and their own causes because they choose their clients 
(or the class of clients) in order to avoid such conflicts.  An indirect conflict 
of interest more commonly arises when the interests of one client are not 
fully compatible with the interests of other future clients who otherwise 
(and perhaps better) embody the lawyer’s cause.  This generally means that 
lawyers have to prioritize among clients.
USSCFY01, Fig. G (1997-2001) (showing that from 1997 to 2001, the percentage of all defendants 
receiving downward departures for substantial assistance ranged from 19.3 to 17.1 percent).
185. Frank O. Bowman, III, When Sentences Don’t Make Sense, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2003, at 
A27.
186. Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering For Social Change: What’s a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 201, 220-21 (1999).
187. Id. at 220 (citing JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A 
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978) and Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social 
Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976) for detailed history on legal 
reform and cause lawyering).
188. See Kirsten Edwards, Found! The Lost Lawyer, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 63-64 (2001)
(defining impact litigation as litigation involving social reform and affecting a broad group of people 
beyond the immediate parties); Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence As Judicial Anomaly: 
Between “The Truly National and the Truly Local”, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1159 n.268 (2001) (defining 
impact litigation as litigation involving systemic relief to large numbers of people).
189. Although this is clearly the case for public defenders it also applies to the many private 
attorneys who take appointed cases.
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The need to prioritize among clients is common among criminal 
defense lawyers, particularly those with limited resources.  Professor Darryl 
K. Brown describes the basis for the triage that often occurs as a result.
Defenders cannot choose to forego a case completely in the way that 
prosecutors can choose not to prosecute a crime, but they can come 
close.  More to the point, they must, and commonly do, vary their level 
of representation among cases toward two ends (the second mandated by 
the first):  allocating extremely limited defense budgets and giving 
priority to some clients in the most important cases.190
Lawyers who are limited in time and financial resources face these 
prioritizing decisions and must resolve them in an ethical and professional 
manner—assuming this is even possible to do.191  Time and funds are 
certainly precious resources for criminal defense lawyers, and must be 
managed accordingly.  But also valuable, and less discussed is the 
parsimony lawyers must employ in distributing their best (and worst) legal 
arguments.  This is a prioritizing dilemma that may be different for criminal 
lawyers who are also cause lawyers.
Two variations of the need to prioritize arise with criminal cause 
lawyers.  On the one hand, there is potential for conflict when lawyers try to 
determine which cases are the best vehicles for raising which claims. This 
means that they avoid wasting good claims and arguments on weak cases or 
cases with unsympathetic facts.  A distinct version of this conflict occurs 
when lawyers try to avoid wasting time and credibility on clients with weak 
cases.  Presumably this is because other cases are more deserving of time or 
risky arguments that might warrant a loss of credibility.
Almost every attorney interviewed discussed the importance of 
maintaining credibility before the judge.192  Interestingly, they weighed the 
benefit to a particular client of making an argument in her case against the 
benefit to future clients.  If it was a strong legal argument (but a weak case) 
otherwise, some lawyers worried that it would be less persuasive later (in a 
190. Darryl K. Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion to Ration Services and Shortchange Some 
Clients, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 207, 207 (2003) (arguing that “this practice is problematic—not because it 
occurs, but because lawyers largely deny it occurs and as a consequence do it poorly”).
191. Brown says that it is and offers a specific suggestion for how attorneys ought to go about 
favoring some clients over others.  Id. at 214 (arguing that these strategic decisions are the sort of 
professional discretion Strickland strongly protects).  He recommends several informal practice 
guideline to improve resource allocation.  First and foremost, there must be enough resources for initial 
case evaluations, in order to better prioritize.  Id. at 215.  Then the decision can be made whether to 
focus on “likely cases of factual innocence” or the likelihood of success in the defense litigation, apart 
from any considerations of factual innocence.  Id.  Brown recommends giving priority to vindicating 
actual innocence, and towards “clients who are likely to gain the greatest benefit from those efforts.”  Id.
This would mean a focus on parties who face the most severe sanctions.  Id.
192. See e.g., Transcript of A21, supra note 57, at 20 (“I put a lot of stake in credibility.  I probably 
put more into it than other people do.  I believe that I cannot do good work for clients in the future 
unless I can establish credibility with the judges for clients that I have now.”).
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more deserving case) to the judge who had already heard and rejected it.  If 
it was a weak argument, some lawyers worried that they would lose 
credibility before the judge and thereby not receive the benefit of the doubt 
when they argued an issue for another client that presented a close call.193
Criminal defense lawyers face this prioritizing daily.One attorney 
described the process as spending one’s “credibility capital.”194  They need 
to decide what arguments to make for the client, considering the possible 
success for the client and the potential effect on the attorney’s future 
credibility in the courtroom.195  For example, one attorney noted the 
importance of balancing her credibility with the client’s demands.196  If she 
makes what she considers to be a borderline frivolous argument to the court 
on behalf of one insistent client, it may hurt her chances of winning in the 
future.197
[U]ltimately my credibility is important to me so there are some 
arguments that I would make because I feel like there is no chance in 
hell they are going to win it. I am not protecting a right that the client 
really has or may have in the future and it is ultimately going to affect 
my credibility with respect not only to this particular client, but to other 
clients that I represent.198
Another attorney characterized this picking and choosing as the 
potential for “crying wolf:”  if you present a judge with one too many 
arguments that she considers frivolous, when the extraordinary situation 
occurs, the judge will not give one the benefit of the doubt.199  “[I]t also 
does more for your credibility . . . maybe not this client, but for the one 
down the road when I can step up and say ‘Judge, you know that if I felt my 
client really, really needed to go to jail, I would tell you,’” explains yet 
another interviewee.200  If this is true, this sort of argument may help the 
attorney’s present client but not the ones that may “need[] to go to jail.” 
This suggests that there are significant concerns about the need to preserve 
credibility in one case with an eye toward future or other cases.
The decision about what arguments to make in what cases and how 
much “credibility capital” each case warranted was more pronounced 
among lawyers who worked consistently with the same judges and 
193. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 30 at 14 (Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A30] 
(talking about the importance of not stretching an argument to the point that it no longer reconciles with 
existing law of the Circuit); Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 8 (discussing the importance of making 
legitimate arguments in terms of the effect that it will have on the outcome for a client).
194. Transcript of A6, supra note 70, at 13.
195. See, e.g., Transcript of A30, supra note 193, at 13.
196. Transcript of A4, supra note 167, at 13.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Transcript of A33, supra note 40, at 13.
200. Transcript of Interview with Attorney 38 at 12 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript of A38].
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prosecutors.  Attorneys who were repeat players in the courtroom, 
particularly the public defenders interviewed, noted this concern.  As one 
explained:
But I do think that if you are in a public defenders office or if you’re in 
private practice when you do um, 95% of your work in a particular 
court, you are to some extent, going to think about the next case before 
you know, call the prosecutor a liar or the judge an idiot or whatever. . . .  
[S]o that you might not take extraordinary steps because you have to 
think about the next case.  And . . . I think it’s something that clients 
perceive as drawback: . . . public representation or in having an 
attorney . . . that works in a particular district all the time.201
In the final analysis, the issue of credibility lies less in the attorney’s 
concern about how she is perceived by others than in her ultimate concern 
for the client and her success in obtaining the best for every client.  While 
most lawyers evaluate themselves as advocates based on their level of 
zealousness, they recognized that they are evaluated by judges based on the 
credibility of their arguments.  The quandary of how to spend this important 
resource of credibility, without detriment to the current client, the future 
client, and the attorney’s cause, is one with which many criminal defense 
attorneys struggle.
IV. THE ETHICS OF CAUSE LAWYERING
A. Is Criminal Defense Cause Lawyering Desirable?
While the categorization of criminal defense lawyers as cause lawyers 
has explanatory power, it also raises interesting questions regarding the 
interplay of personal politics and lawyering and what it means for the 
consumers of criminal legal services.  In essence, are criminal defendants 
generally enriched or disadvantaged when served by lawyers who are 
representing a cause as  well as representing their clients?  It is not possible 
to determine if cause lawyering is better for all criminal defendants in all 
circumstances.  However,  the empirical evidence demonstrates that there 
are many instances in which cause lawyering is very valuable to criminal 
defendants.  Consider the examples provide earlier by the attorneys 
themselves.
In the context of the Anders requirement, it may very well be that the 
cause lawyer’s instinct against the Anders brief is exactly correct.  Not only 
201. Transcript of A19, supra note 79, at 15.  This description of the problems faced by criminal 
defense lawyers who are repeat players in a bureaucratic system is consistent with the classic and well-
known study by sociologist Abraham Blumberg.  See Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a 
Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15 (1967) 
(describing defense attorneys, judges and prosecutors as cooperative players in the courtroom and how 
attorney conduct and advice to clients are influenced in part by the need to satisfy other players).
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do attorneys prefer not to file Anders briefs, it appears that judges may 
prefer not to receive them.  Martha C. Warner, a judge on Florida’s Court of 
Appeals, wrote, “A continuing source of frustration for the appellate judge 
is the review of appeals by indigent defendants whose appointed counsel 
can find no meritorious issues and files what is known as an Anders
brief.”202  Some commentators suggest that judges would rather face a 
possibly meritless appeal than an Anders brief.203  Not only does the brief 
force the court to spend additional resources to review the record and flag 
issues for the attorney that it finds potentially meritorious, but that the 
Anders opinion gives courts insufficient guidance on distinguishing 
between meritless and wholly frivolous cases.  Again, Judge Warner notes 
that  “the Court’s requirements present a logical inconsistency . . . .  If the 
appointed attorney can raise ‘anything that might arguably support an 
appeal,’ then, as a whole it may be without ‘merit,’[but] it would not be 
entirely frivolous.” 204
If it is difficult for courts to distinguish between meritless, frivolous 
and just plain weak, it is even more so for attorneys.  Lawyers trying 
earnestly to respect the ethical rules on frivolity while being zealous 
advocates for their clients have great difficulty predicting what courts really 
expect of criminal defense lawyers on appeal.  One attorney believed that 
the court “frowned on [Anders briefs], chastising us for sloppiness [for 
raising weak issues], but when people raised valid issues, which they did all 
the time, they found a way to deem them frivolous and throw them 
out . . . .”205  Another noted, generally the court. . .doesn’t really like it 
because they don’t like to take the position [that] the defendant doesn’t have 
a legal issue either.”206  Expressing clear frustration with the Court’s mixed 
message regarding the Anders brief, one respondent offered:
You know then they are very quick to criticize what they perceive to be 
frivolous appeals, but at the same time they seem not inclined to accept 
Anders Briefs. So one has to wonder, what is it you think the lawyer 
should do under these circumstances knowing a lawyer has an obligation 
to file a direct appeal at their request to do so by the client.”207
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas addresses this criticism in 
Smith v. Robbins, noting that “the Anders procedure appears to adopt 
gradations of frivolity and to use two different meanings for the phrase 
202. Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States:  Some Appellants’ Equal Protection is More 
Equal Than Others, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 625 (1996).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 632 (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 746 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
205. Transcript of A3, supra note 89, at 10.
206. See Transcript of A23, supra note 42, at 23.
207. Transcript of A10, supra note 39, at 15.
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‘arguable issue.’”208  Attorneys feel trapped between these gradations when 
they are chastised by courts for arguing issues that are too frivolous for 
appeal briefs but not sufficiently frivolous for Anders briefs.
Most criminal defense lawyers caught in this predicament rightly err 
on the side of  full and faithful representation on appeal even if it means 
filing a frivolous brief.  It is their commitment to the cause of “pushing the 
envelope”209 on behalf of disadvantaged clients and against the power of 
government that leads to this position.  This is precisely what we should 
want them to do.  In close cases, it seems that cause lawyers are more likely 
to err on the side of the defendant and on behalf of the cause.  This will 
usually involve better representation of their clients than would a strict 
loyalty to the rules of the court.210
Similarly, the lawyers’ goals of challenging appeal waivers and the 
execution of Miranda warnings are beneficial to defendants and to society.  
Without belaboring the point, the arguments in favor of clearer Miranda 
warnings for bilingual suspects are the same as those in favor of Miranda 
warnings generally.211  To the extent that improving the prophylactic 
benefits are relatively costless for law enforcement (as they were in the case 
described by the attorneys) this is a worthwhile improvement for lawyers to
seek.  When changing the law on the books seems improbable, cause 
lawyers sometimes seek to change the law as it is practiced and executed on 
the streets.  Collective action proved a useful tool in changing legal policy 
regarding Miranda warnings for Spanish-speaking detainees.
Collective action in one jurisdiction was also more effective in 
challenging the appeal waiver policy than was individual negotiation in the 
other jurisdiction.212  Appeals are critically important to the functioning of 
our criminal justice system.  The development of a common law of criminal 
and sentencing law depends on a sizeable and representative appellate 
docket. This is particularly true for a sentencing guideline regime—whether 
advisory or mandatory—that is regularly adjusted by the administrative and 
208. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 282 (2000).
209. Transcript of A10, supra note 39, at 15.
210. On this topic, Judge Warner writes:
If the ultimate fairness of the proceeding is determined by the effectiveness of counsel in 
representing the defendant, then the goal should be to compel full representation through 
appeal and not to allow ways for that representation to be avoided.  Thus, those states that 
refuse to allow withdrawal of counsel on the ground that the appeal is frivolous more 
effectively provide the right than do those who allow counsel to withdraw.
Warner, supra note 202, at 662.
211. Miranda warnings provide constitutional safeguards against violations of the right against self-
incrimination while in custody.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966); see also Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981).  The safeguard is far less effective if the warning is poorly understood or 
misunderstood.
212. See supra notes 169-177 and accompanying text.
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legislative bodies to account for the shifting “heartland” of cases.213  The 
federal sentencing system for instance is based on the need to increase 
uniformity and limit unwarranted sentencing disparity.214  Without 
appeals—or in the instance that the Government can determine through its 
powerful bargaining leverage when appeals can be filed—the risk of greater 
disparity increases significantly.  Some have argued that the Deprat of 
Justice’s policy to seek broad appeal waivers in most cases frustrates the 
Sentencing Reform Act’s goal of using appellate review as a means to 
oversee and contain unwarranted disparity among lower courts.215  As it is, 
only 10 percent of federal cases are appealed and ninety percent of those are 
filed by the defense.216
Obviously, appeals are valuable to individual defendants for correcting 
legal errors at the trial level.  But they are also valuable in correcting 
constitutional violations when the courts decide a case that leads to a 
significant change in the law.  The 1995 United States v. Booker217 decision 
is an excellent example.  When the Supreme Court decided in Booker that 
the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional, the 
expectation was that thousands of defendants who had already been 
sentenced would be effected and seek resentencing.  Interestingly, most of 
the the huge number of defendants who had signed waivers of appeal as 
part of their plea agreements were unable to have their sentences 
reconsidered even though they were sentenced under a regime that was 
deemed unconstitutional.218  Given the twenty years of guideline sentencing 
preceding Booker, it is doubtful that defendants made knowing and 
voluntary waivers of their rights to constitutional sentences.
For the cause lawyer, appellate cases are a far more effective venue for 
seeking  legal change.  By their very nature, appellate cases have a greater 
impact on all the courts  within a jurisdiction.  They often receive media 
coverage that extends beyond the precise jurisdiction.  Even a loss on 
appeal can be a successful way to further publicize an important issue.  
213. Catharine M. Goodwin, The Appeal Waiver Controversy Summary: 1996 Committee on 
Criminal Law Memo on Waivers of Appeal and Advisement of the Right To Appeal, 10 FED. SENT. R. 
212 (1998); John C. Keeney, Appeal Waiver Controversy Justice Department Memo: Use of Sentencing 
Appeal Waivers to Reduce the Number of Sentencing Appeals, 10 FED. SENT. R. 209 (1998).
214. Keeney, supra note 213.
215. See Douglas A. Berman, Windows into Sentencing Policy and Practice:  The Crack/Cocaine 
Ratio and Appeal Waivers, 10 FED. SENT. R. 179, 181-82 (1998).
216. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls. 57 
& 58 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/fig-g.pdf.
217. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
218. See United States v. Bradley, No. 03-6328 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2005) (upholding validity of 
appeal waiver on Booker claims); United States v. Ginard-Henry, No. 04-12677 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 
2005) (refusing to consider defendant’s claim regarding the unconstitutionality of his pre-Booker
sentence due to an appeal waiver).  But see United States v. Killgo, No. 03-3407 (8th Cir. Feb. 9, 2005) 
(reviewing the defendant’s sentence for reasonableness despite the existence of an appeal waiver).
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Given the significant demerits of appeal waivers for defendants and for 
those seeking legal change and development, it is not surprising that 
criminal cause lawyers would strategize to eliminate or limit them as a 
matter of policy.
Finally, it is worth saying a few words about the criminal lawyers who 
adopt an impact litigation approach.  They cautiously select certain  cases in 
which to raise particular issues.  The idea that the criminal defendant and 
her case may be “merely” a vehicle for social change can be distasteful to 
those who insist on a very client-centered approach to lawyering.219  And 
yet, our legal system requires that judicial decisions be made only where 
there is a case or controversy.220  Lawyers may not bring advisory cases 
before the courts or challenge legal doctrines without a particular client or 
case at issue.  It is not then surprising that cause lawyers—lawyers whose 
goal it is to effect social change through the law—would occasionally view 
clients instrumentally. Moreover, the government can lawfully engage in 
this sort of selectivity all the time. It can decide to prosecute or not 
prosecute solely to make good precedent. It can decide to forgo arguments 
in one case  (or even dismiss the case altogether) in order to preserve its 
credibility and time for other cases that offer greater publicity or provide a 
better vehicle with which to make a particular claim.  It is no wonder 
defense lawyers would like to use similar but more limited version of 
selectivity.  However, although a strict reading of our ethics laws might 
forbid such lawyering, this mode of cause lawyering in the criminal defense 
context oftentimes leads to good results for defendants and for the courts.
In addition to the worthwhile goals of criminal defense cause lawyers, 
there is another reason why society may be better off sanctioning some 
forms of cause lawyering even when they formally conflict with classic 
norms of professionalism and ethics.  Some commentators have argued, the 
problem with ineffective and dispassionate criminal defense attorneys is far 
more serious than the problem of overzealous or cause-centered lawyers.221
219. A growing trend among scholars has been the encouragement of a “client-centered” approach 
to lawyering that focuses on the client’s articulated needs and desired outcome and rejects the traditional 
view of lawyers as independent actors making professional legal decisions.  Martha L. Davis, Access to 
Justice: the Transformative Potential of Pro bono Work, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 903, 916 (2004); see also
DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 2-13 (2004) 
(arguing that client preferences and not lawyer preferences or lawyers’ assumptions about client’s 
preferences ought to guide the representation); Robert Dinerstein, Client Centered Counseling: 
Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990) (defining and discussing client-centered 
lawyering as an approach that places the client’s goals at the center of the representation); Lynn Mather, 
What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065 (2003) (same).
220. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAWS OF FEDERAL COURTS 60 (5th ed. 1994) (explaining the 
case or controversy requirement that American courts refrain from deciding “questions of law in a 
vacuum, but only such questions as arise in a ‘case or controversy’”).
221. As Luban argues, the world of most criminal defenders is a world in which
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In the context of concerns about effectiveness and dedication, criminal  
cause lawyers are to some extent model criminal lawyers.  Many cause 
lawyers whose cause is the zealous representation of the underprivileged222
or the importance of giving their clients access to justice223 take very 
seriously their role as effective lawyers.  They struggle over what it means 
to be a “good lawyer” and a “good citizen.”224  The question  over the 
decision to file an Anders brief illustrates this point.  Among the many 
reasons lawyers offered for avoiding the Anders brief is that the appeal 
gives the lawyer a second chance to do better for clients.  As one lawyer put 
it,  “Well, you know, you’re human.  And you always want to look yourself 
in face say you’ve done a good job and sometimes it’s difficult to admit you 
didn’t do the job that you should’ve done.”225  This is a laudable sentiment 
and not one that ought to be discouraged when so many criminal defense 
lawyers are criticized for incompetence and ineffectiveness.226  This is not 
to suggest that everything cause lawyers do is beyond reproach or that they 
should be exempt from ethical regulation.  But if it is the case that some 
forms of cause lawyering are socially beneficial then perhaps the 
professional and ethical rules—particularly those related to conflicts of 
interest— should be sufficiently flexible to account for such lawyering.
B. The Ethics of Cause Lawyering in the Criminal Defense Context
Despite the desirability of the results sought by the cause lawyers 
interviewed, a strict reading of the ethics rules would deem their lawyering 
strategies improper.  Lawyers have long been considered to have a  strict 
duty of loyalty or fidelity to their clients that requires “exclusive devotion” 
no defense at all, rather than an aggressive defense or even desultory defense is the norm; 
a world of miniscule acquittal rates; a world where advocacy is rare and defense 
investigation virtually nonexistent; a world where lawyers spend minutes, rather than 
hours, with their clients; a world in which individualized scrutiny is replaced by the 
indifferent mass-processing of interchangeable clients.
Luban, supra note 66, at 1762; see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE:  RACE AND CLASS IN THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 63-100 (1999) (discussing the extremely poor quality of most 
indigent criminal defense representations); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:  The Death 
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994) (arguing 
that the right to competent counsel remains unattainable until more “defender organizations are 
established and properly funded to employ lawyers at wages and benefits equal to what is spent on the 
prosecution, to retain expert and investigative assistance, to assign lawyers to capital cases, to recruit 
and support local lawyers, and to supervise the performance of counsel”); Richard Klein, The Emperor 
Gideon Has No Clothes:  The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (detailing how severe underfunding undermines the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance).
222. See infra Part I(B).
223. See infra Part I(B).
224. Transcript of A12, supra note 68.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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to the client’s interest.227  Model Rule 1.7 describes two types of situations 
in which a lawyer may not engage in a representation due to conflict.  A 
lawyer has a conflict under Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) if “the representation of 
one client will be directly adverse to another client.”228  And under Model 
Rule 1.7(a)(2) if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyers responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of 
the lawyer.”229  The ALI’s Third Restatement has a similar provision.230
Most lawyers are very cautious not to handle cases in which the 
representation of one client  is directly adverse to that of other clients.  The 
problem for the cause lawyer is that there are a number of instances in 
which one client’s representation may become materially limited by 
concerns for the class of clients generally and the moral and political cause 
of the attorney.  Cause lawyering, in may of its forms,  seems to directly 
violate the rules against “material limitation” conflicts of interest .
“Material limitation” conflicts are more subtle and less obvious than 
“directly adverse” conflicts.  The interests at issue in situations that may 
lead to material limitations do not have to directly oppose the client’s 
goals.A material limitation conflict exists “if there is some pull on the 
lawyer’s judgment” or something about the situation that causes a 
reasonable attorney to pause and question its propriety.231  Nor must the 
lawyer actually behave in a manner or make a decision that negatively 
impacts the client.  The risk of the adverse consequence is sufficient to 
create a conflict because ethical rules tend to be prophylactic in nature.
Material limitation conflicts are a helpful way to understand the cause 
lawyer’s predicament precisely because they focus on the lawyer’s 
incentives and motivations to act.232  As discussed in Part II, cause lawyers 
are often motivated by political and moral goals that are collateral to the 
goals of the client.  The cause is generally one that is consistent with the 
defendant’s interest but may still impact the attorney’s judgment in such a 
way that her decisions experience the pull of her other commitments.
Among the examples offered by the lawyers interviewed, the collective 
action strategy regarding the execution of Miranda warnings for bilingual 
227. Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,733).
228. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2003).
229. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2003).
230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2000) (“A conflict of 
interest is involved if there is substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be 
materially or adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to another 
current client, a former client, or a third person.”).
231. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 266 
(2004).
232. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 395 (2005).
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detainees seems the least objectionable from a conflict of interest 
standpoint.  Yet even this scenario may materially limit the attorney’s 
representation.  The lawyer’s decision to question officers about the reading 
of Miranda warnings in a case where the warnings raise no legal concerns 
will probably not be directly adverse to the client’s interest.  While this 
tactic may pose no risk in some cases, in other cases a lawyer who was 
thinking only of her client’s interests might decide not to raise that issue for 
a variety of reasons.  But time and good-will are limited resources in 
criminal courtrooms.  Raising this issue may be time consuming; it may 
distract from relevant issues; it may annoy the judge and prosecutor; it may 
anger the officer who might otherwise have provided helpful testimony.  If 
nothing else, using a predetermined blanket strategy in every case seems to 
deprive the defendant of individualized treatment and representation.  It 
certainly does not consist of the “exclusive devotion” underlying the 
principle of loyalty in the attorney-client relationship.233
The same argument can be made of the other use of the collective 
action strategy described by some of the attorneys to challenge the 
government’s policy of appeal waivers.  The conflict involved here 
potentially involves adverse impact as well as material limitation.  The 
lawyers explained that in plea agreements where defendants were receiving 
something substantial in exchange for their waiver of appellate rights—or 
to put it another way, in cases where declining the plea agreement would 
have an adverse impact on the client—they would recommend the plea deal.  
Yet this caution hardly seems to eliminate the “pull” on the attorney’s 
judgment that emanates from the collective agreement with other colleagues 
on behalf of their clients.
The dilemma regarding the Anders brief also raises a distinct ethical 
concern.  First, to the extent that a case has no merit and an attorney 
knowingly files a standard brief raising claims as though they were 
legitimate, the attorney violates the rules against making frivolous 
arguments.234  As officers of the court permitted to practice under a state-
issued license, attorneys have duties of professionalism they are bound to 
respect. The decision to ignore the rules established by  the Court in Anders
and enacted into most court rules, attorneys who purposefully ignore 
Anders engage in a form of civil disobedience.  The attorneys who avoid 
Anders briefs do so for two significant reasons: they want to give their 
clients “their day in court” at the appellate level and they worry that the 
233. Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,733).
234. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (stating that “a lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for 
doing so that is not frivolous.”).
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time-consuming nature of the Anders brief will harm other clients.  Again 
this becomes an issue of triage between clients that could otherwise cause 
material limitations in representation.
The problem of “materially limited” conflicts is sometimes described 
as one of lawyers “pulling [] punches” or “soft-pedaling” the 
representation.235  In a sense, this is precisely what is at issue when criminal 
defense lawyers use the impact litigation strategy of seeking test cases in 
which to raise to particular issues or when they decline to raise issues in 
certain cases so as to reserve their credibility for more deserving cases.  
Cause lawyers may engage in such practices not to deprive current clients 
but to aid future clients.  For instance, as one commentator has previously, 
lawyers become more effective representatives of future clients if they are 
willing to provide less than fully zealous advocacy for current clients. 236
Attorneys may attempt justify these practices on numerous grounds.  First,  
there may be no direct adverse impact  if the cases are such that they would 
not prevail anyway.  Nor, one could argue, would there be a Sixth 
Amendment violation if the attorney can argue that the decision to raise or 
not raise an issue was a strategic one. 237  Indeed, one could argue that this 
is not a problem at all under our rules of ethics and professionalism because 
a lawyer is not required to make every argument or raise every claim that 
the client wants.  Clients may decide the objectives of the representation but 
lawyers, using their legal expertise, may decide the means.238 But the 
argument that a lawyer’s decision to give priority to one client over another 
is not an ethical conflict if it amounts to a strategic decisions regarding the 
means of representation is not ultimately persuasive.  Perhaps the lawyer’s 
tactical decisions would be ethically justified if they were based only on the 
best of the interest of the client.  But once the attorney begins to weigh the 
interests of the clients against the cause or that of other clients, the lawyer’s 
representation becomes materially limited.
While the ethics rules are necessary to regulate lawyer conduct 
generally, they seem woefully out of touch with the realities of cause-
centered criminal defense work.  They effectively prohibit many of the 
235. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 232, at 395.
236. W. Bradley Wendel, The Deep Structure of Conflicts of Interest, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 
(2003).
237. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-93 (1984).  The Strickland test used by the 
Supreme Court in assessing an attorney’s ineffectiveness excludes unsuccessful strategic decisions by 
lawyers as evidence of ineffectiveness.  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (stating that 
appellate courts are to be “highly deferential” when reviewing tactical decisions of defense attorneys for 
purposes of assessing ineffective assistance of counsel).
238. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) (“A lawyer is not bound, 
however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client.  For example, a lawyer may 
have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be 
pursued.”).
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strategies employed by cause lawyers to the extent that some of these 
strategies take into account the welfare of other criminal defendants—
whether they be other clients or similarly situated third parties.  The options 
permitted by the ethical rules in such situations—withdrawing from the 
conflicted representation or proceeding with the informed consent of the 
client—leave much to be desired in the context of indigent criminal 
defense.  The high caseloads and limited resources of many criminal 
defense lawyers make the notion of withdrawal impractical.  Defendants 
would likely be worse off with fewer qualified attorneys available to do the 
work than they would be with the existing conflict.  The criminal justice 
system would come to a standstill if lawyers regularly withdrew from cases 
in which they harbored ulterior motives of social change.  In short, 
excessive concern about this sort of conflict might unjustly deprive criminal 
defendants of competent and zealous representation.
C. No Quick Fix: The Impracticality of Waiver
The laws of ethics themselves provide a means of resolving conflicts 
of interest:  knowing and informed consent by a competent client.  
Although some conflicts cannot be waived by the client even with informed 
consent, the conflicts encountered by criminal defense cause lawyers and 
their clients does not formally fall into the realm of non-waivable conflicts.  
The ALI’s Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers explains that:
Notwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or former 
client, a lawyer may not represent a client if:
(a) the representation is prohibited by law;
(b) one client will assert a claim against the other in the same litigation; 
or
(c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will 
be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the 
clients.239
Subsections (a) and (b) are obviously not implicated in the types of 
conflicts discussed by the attorneys interviewed in this study.  The third 
subsection is probably not implicated either.  The threshold of “adequate 
representation” is fairly low.  For instance the Sixth Amendment  
constitutional guarantee of “effective assistance” of counsel seems more 
demanding than the “adequate assistance” requirement.  And yet, the 
leading case on ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal context 
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §122(2) (2000).  The Model Rules 
have a corresponding provision.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (b)-(b)(3) (2003).
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makes it very difficult for defendants to succeed on such a claim.240  This is 
particularly true if the attorney’s conduct is based on a strategic choice 
(even an ill-advised one) rather than on incompetence or negligence.241
But although the rules suggest that these conflicts theoretically could 
be consented to with full disclosure, consent is impractical and undesirable 
in reality.  Let us return full-circle to the predicament facing Attorney Barry 
Tarlow—who had a policy against representing cooperating informants—
and his then client Jose Orlando Lopez.  While we can speculate as to the
reason for Tarlow’s belief in the immorality of snitches, his reasons are 
immaterial to the conflict analysis.  An ethical conflict exists so long as 
Lopez’ representation would be materially limited by Tarlow’s  
commitment to his moral cause.  Tarlow’s response was to explain the 
limitation to his prospective client.  The client knowingly agreed to the 
representation despite this limitation.  But during the course of the 
representation, when Lopez realized that he might want to consider the 
government’s offer to provide evidence in return for a favorable plea 
agreement, he did not fire Tarlow or seek new counsel (as the ethical rules 
would expect) when a potential conflict becomes an actual conflict.242
Instead, Lopez attempted to negotiate unsuccessfully on his own.  It is 
unclear if he revealed important weaknesses in his case,  made admissions, 
or did anything else during these failed negotiations with prosecutors that 
had an adverse impact on his case.
What is clear is that waiver is not an effective strategy for criminal 
defendants like Lopez.  First, it would be nearly impossible to obtain a 
knowing and informed waiver.  The subtlety of material limitation conflicts 
can render them difficult to explain and anticipate.  Second, requiring 
defendants to forego representation by lawyers who are motivated by 
240. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (explaining that among other things, a defendant must show that 
the lawyer’s acts or omissions were “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance”).  
Generally, the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Strickland for evaluating claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that counsel’s performance was seriously deficient 
and that the deficient performance was so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  Id. at 
687.  The absence of zealous advocacy is not presumed sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test.
241. See United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 496 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding decision by defense 
attorney not to recall inconsistent witness for further questioning “tactical decision” reflecting 
reasonable professional judgment that cannot be considered ineffective assistance); Bashor v. Risley, 
730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that tactical decisions are not ineffective simply because in 
retrospect better tactics are known to have been available); United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 
(9th Cir. 1981) (stating that “nothing more than a difference of opinion” as to trial tactics does not 
establish denial of effective assistance); Gallo v. Kernan, 933 F. Supp. 878, 881-82 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 
(establishing that defense counsel’s decision not to use inconsistent statements to impeach witness was 
“tactical,” and holding that it is “well settled” that impeachment strategy is a matter of trial tactics).
242. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt e, §122 cmt. f. 
(2000) (explaining that a conflict that was not initially apparent or a conflict for which consent is later 
revoked usually requires the withdrawal and replacement of counsel).
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political or social causes would greatly limit the availability of many highly 
regarded lawyers.  Apparently, one of the reasons Lopez insisted on hiring 
Tarlow despite the limitation was that Tarlow had an excellent reputation 
for being a dogged criminal defense attorney who got good results.  Third, 
those defendants who accept the representation and then change their minds 
may experience greater difficulty in changing attorneys than do clients in 
other contexts.  Not only do criminal cases move more rapidly than civil 
cases generally but the majority of criminal defendants are of moderate 
means and have limited resources.  The Tarlow/Lopez scenario warns us 
that it would be folly to rely on client waivers to solve the ethical problem 
of diverging interests that arises from cause lawyering.
A detailed solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this paper 
and must be left to another day.  One possibility would be to amend the 
ethics rules so as to provide an exemption for criminal defense lawyers.  
This would not be the first argument in favor of exempting criminal defense 
attorneys from specific ethics norms.243  Another possibility would be to 
more effectively prohibit criminal defense cause lawyering, or at least 
certain forms of it.  A cause-benefit analysis would need to be undertaken in 
which the benefits of having committed and competent defense attorneys 
should be seriously weighed against the drawbacks of these ethical 
concerns.  Besides, my own experience and the interviews from this study 
suggest that the cause-based mentality may be pervasive in criminal 
defending and difficult to eradicate.  A third possibility is to continue with 
the status quo, while increasing ethics training among lawyers to help them 
better identify possible conflicts and educate their clients about them.  None 
of these possible solutions are perfect or easy.  The principal goal of this 
paper is to expose the ethical tensions that exist in a growing, and often 
socially-beneficial, trend among lawyers to use the law as a means of 
societal change.  Only then can we engage in an honest dialogue about good 
cause lawyering versus bad cause lawyering. 244  The practice of law, even 
when motivated by good intentions and causes, must still be subject to 
ethical standards.  But those standards must be informed by honest dialogue 
243. Professor William Simon describes a trend among scholars arguing for a relaxation of certain 
ethical rules for criminal defense lawyers.  See William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993) (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58-66 
(1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605 (1985); 
Richard Wasserstron, Lawyers as Professionasl: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975)).
244. Manuel Berrélez et al., Note, Disappearing Dilemmas: Judicial Construction Of Ethical 
Choice As Strategic Behavior In The Criminal Defense Context, 23 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 225, 226 
(2005) (arguing that greater intellectual honesty in the treatment of ethical issues in the criminal defense 
context will help judges and practitioners to distinguish between “strategic choices that genuinely 
represent bad lawyering and those choices that actually reflect laudable attempts to inject an ethical 
dimension into the criminal defense process”).
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regarding the realities of cause lawyering if they are to be accepted by the 
attorneys and courts that must implement them.
CONCLUSION
My own impression from years as a public defender was that most 
criminal defense lawyers are as motivated by political and moral beliefs 
about injustice or the need for legal reform in the criminal process as they 
are by the particular interests of their clients.  Criminal defense attorneys 
tend to feel strongly about the work they do, tend to share a worldview 
about the prevalence of injustice, perceive themselves as fighting for a 
“cause.” While these causes may contribute to positive social change in the 
criminal law context, they are not without costs.  This paper explores the 
causes that motivate criminal defense lawyers to do what they do and some 
of the ethical costs of their cause-centered lawyering.
In considering the motives that animate the criminal defense agenda, I 
rely on the well-developed literature on cause lawyering along with data 
from a qualitative study involving interviews of forty criminal defense 
attorneys.  The respondents were questioned about the factors that influence 
their advocacy practices, the motivations for their advocacy decisions, and 
what they perceived to be the goals of their jobs.  Even within this small 
sample, there is much evidence to support  that many of them are in fact 
engaged in cause-lawyering as that term is defined in the extant literature.  
Their motives ranged from ideological to experiential to personality-based 
and their strategies focused on changing the law and its impact on people 
like their clients.  Their orientations invoked themes that permeate the 
practice of criminal defending.  They also help shed light on the 
motivations of attorneys more generally to enter and remain in other cause 
lawyering practices.
It’s my hope that understanding criminal defense lawyers as cause 
lawyers—albeit an unusual breed—could help shed light on the particular 
aspects of the cause lawyering enterprise.  In this Article, I take a first step 
in this direction by exploring some  of the ethical conflicts encountered by 
criminal defense lawyers qua cause lawyers.  Criminal defense attorneys 
who are committed to improving the lot of criminal defendants as a group 
and the laws that govern them, occasionally face situations in which their 
individual client’s interests are not fully compatible.  While the client’s 
needs may not be directly adverse to the lawyer’s other goals, these 
situations involve more subtle conflicts labeled by the ethics rules as 
leading to “materially limited” representation by the lawyer.  The ethics 
rules generally permit the client to waive such conflicts once they have been 
informed by the attorney, I argue that waiver in these instances is highly 
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impractical.  While a solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it appears that a more flexible approach to the rules of ethics is 
needed in the context of criminal cause lawyering if this type of lawyering 
continues to be deemed valuable.
